University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2014

Computational Models of Information Processing
Wendy Ham
University of Pennsylvania, wendyham@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Ham, Wendy, "Computational Models of Information Processing" (2014). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 1304.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1304

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1304
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Computational Models of Information Processing
Abstract
The necessity and desire to understand the nature of information permeates virtually all aspects of
scientific endeavors in both natural and social systems. This is particularly true in research that seeks to
understand how various forms of organizations arise and function. This dissertation is dedicated towards
understanding one important concern in the study of information in organizations: that of information
integrity. There are two aspects of information integrity that are interesting to examine in management
contexts: First, because the definition and quantification of information is often nebulous, the onus to
preserve information integrity, from ensuring a successful information transfer to minimizing distortion, to
a large extent falls on the information recipient. Second, unlike in physical systems, in which there tends
to be a clear demarcation between the information processing system and the environment, the boundary
between the two in management contexts is usually more diffuse, which can give rise to complex
interactions. The structure of the environment can thus have a significant influence on an information
recipient's ability to process information and to preserve its integrity. I present two computational models
to develop theories about these aspects: In the first, I look at how an organization's strategic effort to
acquire (and therefore receive) information co-evolves with its absorptive capacity in different types of
environment. Here, loss of information integrity is defined by acquisition failure. The model suggests that
an exploitative information acquisition strategy could better preserve information integrity and eventually
generate a more diverse knowledge stock than an explorative strategy could, thereby challenging
common assumptions. The model also highlights several environmental and cognitive parameters that
modulate the relationship between information acquisition strategy and its outcome. In the second
model, I look at information processing in the context of event forecasting. The model is built on the idea
that events have structural signatures that are given by the web of causal relationships from which those
events arise. As forecasters receive information about an event, their failure to preserve the integrity of
the event's structural information hurts forecast performance, but interestingly, some events have
structural characteristics that buffer against this effect.
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ABSTRACT

COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF INFORMATION PROCESSING
Wendy Ham
Daniel A. Levinthal
The necessity and desire to understand the nature of information permeates virtually all
aspects of scientific endeavors in both natural and social systems. This is particularly true
in research that seeks to understand how various forms of organizations arise and
function. This dissertation is dedicated towards understanding one important concern in
the study of information in organizations: that of information integrity. There are two
aspects of information integrity that are interesting to examine in management contexts:
First, because the definition and quantification of information is often nebulous, the onus
to preserve information integrity, from ensuring a successful information transfer to
minimizing distortion, to a large extent falls on the information recipient. Second, unlike
in physical systems, in which there tends to be a clear demarcation between the
information processing system and the environment, the boundary between the two in
management contexts is usually more diffuse, which can give rise to complex
interactions. The structure of the environment can thus have a significant influence on an
information recipient’s ability to process information and to preserve its integrity. I
present two computational models to develop theories about these aspects: In the first, I
look at how an organization’s strategic effort to acquire (and therefore receive)
information co-evolves with its absorptive capacity in different types of environment.
v

Here, loss of information integrity is defined by acquisition failure. The model suggests
that an exploitative information acquisition strategy could better preserve information
integrity and eventually generate a more diverse knowledge stock than an explorative
strategy could, thereby challenging common assumptions. The model also highlights
several environmental and cognitive parameters that modulate the relationship between
information acquisition strategy and its outcome. In the second model, I look at
information processing in the context of event forecasting. The model is built on the idea
that events have structural signatures that are given by the web of causal relationships
from which those events arise. As forecasters receive information about an event, their
failure to preserve the integrity of the event’s structural information hurts forecast
performance, but interestingly, some events have structural characteristics that buffer
against this effect.
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CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION, INFORMATION, AND THE PROBLEM OF INTEGRITY
The necessity and desire to understand the nature of information permeates
virtually all aspects of scientific endeavors in both natural and social systems. This is
particularly true in research that seeks to understand how various forms of organizations
arise and function. Organization implies coordination, and coordination entails the
capture, storage, transmission, manipulation, aggregation, and interpretation of
information. The studies of organization and of information are inevitably intertwined.
The inseparability of organization and information is illustrated by the ease with
which the particular interests of a scientific discipline that is concerned with
understanding organizations can be redescribed as a study of information. Life sciences,
for instance, are dedicated to deciphering puzzles about how molecular building blocks
are organized to produce sophisticated structures that are capable of self-regulating, selfperpetuating, and self-evolving. Yet, strands of research in life sciences can be readily
reconceptualized as an effort to understand various facets of information: Geneticists are
concerned with the ways in which information is stored and transmitted across
generations of cells and organisms; molecular biologists study various signaling
pathways through which information is manipulated to facilitate intra- and extracellular
communications; developmental biologists look at how undifferentiated cells process
information that allows them to grow and combine into specialized tissues;
immunologists study how information about pathogen invasion is relayed to activate a
1

repertoire of defense mechanisms; neurobiologists study how information is converted
back and forth in the forms of electrical and chemical signals to generate complex
configurations that are themselves capable of governing other information processing
systems.
Much like the subdisciplines of life sciences above, some of the most important
research in management can be described as studies of information: Nelson and Winter’s
(1982) work on routines, for instance, is about identifying the form of information
encoding that allows firms to preserve their capabilities amidst evolutionary pressures.
Radner’s (1992) work on types of hierarchy is about a firm’s particular necessities to
manage its information processing activities. Coase’s (1937) and Williamson’s (1981)
work on the boundary of the firm is about understanding the cost of information search,
and in a similar vein, Nickerson and Zenger’s (2004) work on firm configurations is
about identifying optimal information organizing efforts. Staw et al.’s (1981) work on
threat-rigidity effects is about how firms translate information about adversity into
adjustments of internal structure and external actions. Hambrick et al.’s (1996) work on
top management teams is about how information processing at the executive level
influences a firm’s competitive decisions.
The examples above illustrate more than just the omnipresence of concerns about
information in various studies of organization. Rather, they also suggest that in the study
of organization, there is often an explicit or implicit consideration of information
integrity. The problem of information encoding, such as in the study of genetics or
2

organizational routines, is fundamentally about the preservation of information integrity.
On the other hand, the problems of information transmission and information processing,
such as in the study of cell signaling pathways or organizational hierarchy, are not
primarily about information integrity but nevertheless depend on the presumption of it.
The problem of information integrity is one that has received considerable
attention in engineering. Advancements in electrical communication in the last couple
centuries, which can be traced back to Samuel Morse’s development of the electrical
telegraph in the 1800s, have necessitated a closer look at the problem (Beauchamp, 2001;
Pierce, 1980). Due to physical limitations, signal transmission via electrical
communication systems is prone to noise, interference, and distortion. Information theory
emerged in the 1940’s to assign a formal treatment to this problem; Claude Shannon’s
(1948) seminal paper, which is widely considered to have marked the birth of information
theory, begins with a succinct assertion that captures the essence of concerns about
information integrity: “The fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another
point.”
The basic framework of information theory entails the transmission of
information from a source to a receiver. It divides the problem of information integrity
into two main components: the problem of representing information at the source and the
problem of delivering that information to the receiver. Both components determine the
reliability with which the information can be reconstructed, processed, and subsequently
3

utilized at the receiving end. The premise of the first component is that information in its
raw form is usually compressible; there are typically redundant or unnecessary elements
in the original representation of information that can be removed to allow for a more
compact, algorithmic description (Shannon, 1948; Wade, 1994). The implicit
assumptions here are that information representation imposes some costs and that there is
only a limited amount of resources available to absorb those costs. The premise of the
second component is that the channel through which information is delivered has a
maximum capacity; there are factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the channel that makes
information delivery susceptible to noise, interference, and distortion (Shannon, 1948).
The subfield of channel coding theory concerns itself with this problem; it consists of
techniques for allowing efficient and faithful signal transmissions across imperfect
channels (e.g., Hamming, 1950).
These concepts are familiar to management researchers. With regards to the
problem of information representation, scholars have long recognized that some types of
information are more compressible than others: Tacit knowledge is often contrasted with
explicit knowledge; the former is difficult to describe and thus also difficult to transfer,
whereas the latter can be readily codified and shared (Nonaka, 1991; Polanyi, 1958).
With regards to the problem of information delivery, management scholars typically take
a holistic approach and look at the characteristics of the information that is to be
delivered, the channel through which it is to be delivered, and the intended recipient of
the information. The combination of these factors, for example, provides some
explanations for why information sometimes appears to be “sticky” (e.g., Szulanski,
4

1996; von Hippel, 1994). It is interesting to note here that both management scholars and
information theorists explicitly recognize that the delivery of information is not
frictionless or costless. This resemblance in insights is not to be taken for granted: As von
Hippel (1994) observed, “… the central tendency in economic theorizing has been to
view information as costlessly transferrable, and much of the research on the special
character of markets for information has been based precisely on this characteristic…
However, a number of scholars with an empirical as well as theoretical interest in the
economics and diffusion of technological information have long argued, and to some
extent shown, that the costs of information transfer in technical projects can vary
significantly (Nelson, 1959, 1982; Rosenberg, 1982; Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1968;
Pavitt, 1987; and Teece, 1977).”
Although it is interesting to note the similarities between the frameworks based on
which management scholars and information theorists look at the problem of information
integrity, there are several important differences: As previously discussed, the bulk of
information theorists’ focus is on the source and the channel, whereas management
scholars pay sizable attention not only to those two components but also to the recipient
of information. While information in information theory is defined in terms of precisely
quantified bits, the definition and quantification of information in management research
is far more nebulous (Weick, 1979). The processing of information in management
contexts typically entails a great deal of interpretive effort on behalf of the recipient,
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owing to the ambiguous nature of the information in question (Kaplan, 2008).1
Furthermore, information transfer is frequently initiated by the recipient rather than the
source (e.g., Borgatti & Cross, 2003). The onus to preserve information integrity, from
ensuring a successful information transfer to minimizing distortion, to a large extent thus
falls on the information recipient.
Another noteworthy difference between management contexts and physical
systems (in which information theory is typically applied) is that in the latter, due to their
physical nature, it is usually possible to identify with little ambiguity the boundary
between the information processing system and the environment (i.e., everything else
outside of the system). Consequently, it is possible to analyze the interacting components
of an information processing system in relative isolation. In management contexts, the
boundary is more diffuse. A conversation between two organizational actors, for instance,
never occurs in a vacuum but is always influenced by the particular circumstances in
which that conversation takes place. Such circumstances are derived from a multitude of
possible factors outside of those that pertain directly to the individuals (e.g., Daft &
Weick, 1984; Russell, 1980), including task-level ones, such as problem structure
(Newell & Simon, 1972), group-level ones, such as group norms (Feldman, 1984), and
organizational-level ones, such as organizational culture (Schein, 1985).

1

This is why the term knowledge rather than information is usually more appropriate in management
contexts; once a layer of interpretation is added to information, as is inevitably the case when information
gets processed by human actors, information becomes knowledge (Lehrer, 2000). For consistency, I use the
term information for the most part in this chapter. In subsequent chapters, however, because my discussions
are explicitly about information that gets processed by human actors, I use the term knowledge.
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The next two chapters in this dissertation are dedicated towards examining the
problem of information integrity by taking into account the two distinguishing aspects of
information studies in management research described above: the role of the information
recipient and the influence of environmental attributes. In the first of the two chapters, I
look at the organization as the information recipient, specifically how its strategic effort
to acquire (and therefore receive) information co-evolves with its absorptive capacity
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) in different types of environments. Here, the preservation of
information integrity is defined by acquisition success. In the last chapter, I look at the
individual actor as the information recipient, specifically how such an actor processes
information in order to offer predictions about an event. I discuss in detail the
mechanisms by which the failure to preserve the integrity of information about the
environment hurts forecast performance, and I also show that, interestingly, some types
of environmental structure can sometimes buffer against this effect.
Another common thread between the two chapters is that they are both aimed at
unpacking some mechanisms in information processing that have typically been treated
as a black box in the literature. The method employed in both chapters is computational
modeling, which allows for the development of theories about mechanisms that are
difficult to observe in the empirical setting. In this regard, I share a common goal with
some existing lines of work, such as the use of neural net models to unpack the
mechanisms of analogical reasoning (Gavetti & Warglien, 2007). I provide a brief
preview below of the key ideas in and contributions of each of the two chapters:

7

Chapter 2: The interactions between information recipient and environmental
attributes in information acquisition
Organizations presumably seek to acquire information according to a particular
strategy rather than mindlessly. In this chapter, I look at two ideal types of information
acquisition strategy: exploitative and explorative (cf. March, 1991). A purely exploitative
organization is one that seeks to acquire information that is as local or as closely related
as possible to the set of information it already has, whereas an explorative organization is
one that seeks to acquire information that is as distant or as unrelated as possible to the
set of information it already has (cf. Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000;
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; March & Simon, 1958).
A common assumption in the organizational learning literature is that
organizations should employ an explorative information acquisition strategy when it
seeks to diversify its stock of information. This assumption is worth revisiting, however,
considering that empirical studies have shown that in reality, organizations often fail to
acquire distant information despite repeated attempts (e.g., Monteiro, 2009). On the other
hand, organizations that deliberately focus on acquiring local information sometimes find
themselves well-positioned to acquire distant information: Kao’s expertise in soap, for
instance, opened up new opportunities in floppy disk manufacturing due to some
technological overlaps between the two domains (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001).
An organization’s unsuccessful attempt at acquiring information that it intends to
acquire is essentially equivalent to a complete failure to preserve information integrity.
8

To understand the mechanisms behind this phenomenon, I build a computational model
with absorptive capacity as the guiding framework (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). There are
three basic assumptions embedded in the model: First, an organization’s absorptive
capacity is shaped by the organization’s existing stock of information; second, as the
organization successfully acquires new information, the new information is incorporated
into the organization’s stock of information, thereby reshaping its absorptive capacity;
third, information acquisition strategy is treated as a stable, exogenous attribute of the
organization. (In contrast, absorptive capacity is thus treated as an endogenous variable.)
The information acquisition mechanism itself is modeled as a two-step process: In the
first step, the organization chooses information that it intends to acquire, and in the
second step, it attempts to actually acquire it. The first step is guided by the
organization’s information acquisition strategy, whereas the outcome of the second step
depends on whether the organization is endowed with the requisite absorptive capacity.
The model further takes into account the role of the environment in influencing
the outcome of an information acquisition attempt. (An organization is assumed to
operate within an information acquisition environment.) The attribute of the environment
that is explored in the model is the level of diversity of information that it contains. The
interaction between environment diversity and information acquisition strategy is easy to
see: An explorative organization, for example, would tend to have more difficulty finding
distant knowledge in an environment characterized by low diversity. It does not
necessarily mean, however, that it would be less successful in acquiring new information
in general, since this depends on absorptive capacity rather than strategy.
9

Simulation results show that an exploitative strategy can outperform an
explorative one in a wide range of conditions. Performance in this case is measured by
the volume and the diversity of the stock of information that the organization
accumulates over time. The model furthermore shows that a number of additional factors,
such as sensitivity to information distance, requirement for repeated engagement with
information, and depreciation of information stock over time, can exacerbate the
explorative organization’s difficulty in acquiring new knowledge and therefore in
preserving information integrity. The results presented in this chapter thus offer an
interesting and perhaps counterintuitive insight that an organization’s quest for diverse
information can often be better served by an exploitative rather than explorative
information acquisition strategy.
Chapter 3: The interactions between information recipient and environmental
attributes in the use of information to make predictions
Whereas the research presented in Chapter 2 as summarized above primarily
looks at ensuring successful information transfer as the basic requirement for the
preservation of information integrity, the research presented in Chapter 3 examines
another element: that of information distortion. The research in Chapter 3 also goes
beyond information acquisition; it looks at the way in which information subsequently
gets processed and utilized. The specific task with which the information recipient is
assigned is predicting the occurrence of an event.
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The primary research question in this chapter is: What does it take to make the
most accurate predictions possible? This question can be divided into two parts: The first
is about events themselves—do events have particular attributes that make them easier or
harder to predict? (It should be noted that here, an event is considered a part of the
environment such that event attributes are considered environmental attributes.) The
second part of the question is about the forecaster’s cognitive mechanism—what is it
about a forecaster’s thinking style that translates into superior or inferior forecast
performance?
To examine the questions above, I build a computational model based on the idea
that events have structural attributes. Events have causes, and those causes typically
materialize in the form of preceding events (referred to as precursors), which in turn have
their own causes. An event’s structural attributes are defined by the way in which its
precursors are connected to each other via causal relationships. Two structural attributes
of an event that the model explores are the density and the distribution of causal
relationships.
At a given point in time, two kinds of information are available to describe an
event: the first is information about its causal structure, and the second is information
about the extent of precursor activation in its causal structure, including information
about which specific precursors have already been activated. The former is independent
of time, whereas the latter can change over time. Forecasters, as the recipients of
information, may differ in their ability to avoid or minimize distortions in processing
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these two kinds of information. To take this consideration into account, the model
incorporates representations of several types of cognitive imperfections that may affect a
forecaster’s perception of information about an event: ignorance about the event’s causal
structure, arbitrary lack of attention, big-picture bias (treating information as more
general than it really is), and temporal bias (having an attentional bias towards newer or
older information). The time at which a forecaster is asked to make a prediction also
matters and is thus included in the model; the more time has passed, the more information
about the event tends to be available to the forecaster.
Simulation results show complex interactions between the types of cognitive
imperfection above and the attributes of an event’s causal structure. While information
distortion generally hurts forecast performance, some types of causal structure seem to
buffer against this effect. Simulation results also show that depending on an event’s
causal structure, efforts to avoid information distortion may not be worth the cost as they
only marginally improve forecast performance.
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CHAPTER 2
BITE OFF WHAT YOU CAN CHEW? KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
STRATEGY AND THE EVOLUTION OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
1. Introduction
The choices an organization makes typically have lasting consequences. Path
dependence is a well-studied explanation for this (e.g., Arthur, 1994; Nerkar, 2003): An
organization does not have a blank slate at a given point in time but must rather continue
from the leading edge of its traveled path. Choices themselves often have persistent
characteristics; each choice is drawn not randomly but as guided by some overarching
strategy (Nath & Sudharshan, 1994; Porter, 1980). Furthermore, the outcome of each
choice often alters organizational resources on which the execution of strategy itself
depends (cf. Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).
I apply this understanding to the context of organizational learning. In particular, I
look at how strategy directs choice in knowledge acquisition, and how over time it shapes
the organization’s knowledge stock and subsequently absorptive capacity (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990), which themselves are important resources in knowledge acquisition. I
thus conceptualize organizational learning as a continuous feedback loop, in which I treat
knowledge acquisition strategy as a stable exogenous attribute but knowledge acquisition
process and outcome as endogenous and perpetually evolving. My approach emphasizes
the evolutionary nature of the learning process, which points to the malleability of
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absorptive capacity over time. In this regard, I follow a long line of theoretical and
empirical work that draws attention to the recursive element of absorptive capacity (e.g.,
Ahuja, 2000; Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lyles & Salk,
1996; Pennings & Harianto, 1992; Pisano, 1994; Shane, 2000; Stuart, 1998).
Based on this approach, I build a computational model to offer some insights into
a common problem in organizational learning: When should organizations make
persistent attempts to acquire local versus distant knowledge? I review below why
organizations face this choice and why a particular knowledge acquisition strategy may
or may not lead to its intended outcome. I then present my model, within which I derive
several boundary conditions that are defined by the following parameters: distance
sensitivity, magnitude sensitivity, and age sensitivity.
1.1. Exploitative and explorative strategies in knowledge acquisition
Knowledge acquisition strategy can be characterized according to a dimension
with two extremes: exploitative and explorative (March, 1991). A purely exploitative
organization is one that chooses to acquire new knowledge that is as local as possible to
its existing knowledge stock (cf. Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000;
March & Simon, 1958), whereas a purely explorative organization is one that chooses to
acquire new knowledge that is as distant as possible. In reality, organizations adopt a
knowledge acquisition strategy that resides somewhere in between these two extremes
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002). An organization’s choice in knowledge acquisition may
therefore be positively or negatively correlated to the contents of its knowledge stock; an
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exploitative strategy can be viewed as diversity avoiding and an explorative strategy
diversity seeking.
Each of the two knowledge acquisition strategies above has its benefits and
limitations. Organizations may lean toward being exploitative for a number of reasons,
such as to minimize knowledge acquisition and integration costs (Dosi, 1988; Grant,
1996), as well as to increase the chances of synergy among existing knowledge bases
(Henderson, 1994). Consistent with these lines of reasoning, Helfat (1994) found that
firm-level R&D investments become more focused over time in a path-dependent
manner. Furthermore, Stuart and Podolny (1996) found that even in the face of major
technology shifts, firms often made only limited adjustments to the scope of their
technological search. A limitation that is frequently attributed to the exploitative strategy
is that it can lead organizations to develop ‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or fall
into ‘competency traps’ (Levitt & March, 1988). Furthermore, since the exploitative
strategy can be viewed as diversity avoiding, it may limit an organization’s combinative
capability (Kogut & Zander, 1992) such that it generates mostly incremental rather than
breakthrough innovations (Dewar & Dutton, 1986).
The explorative knowledge acquisition strategy, on the other hand, is often lauded
as being important for organizational performance and survival due to its promise of
bringing into the organization distant knowledge that can be recombined to produce
breakthrough innovations (Fleming, 2001; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Many illustrative
examples of such innovations have been documented in the literature: Merrill Lynch
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developed its approach to retail brokerage by borrowing ideas from the supermarket
business (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005); IDEO designed the articulating ball-andsocket joint design for desk lamps based on principles in human hip-bone sockets
(Hargadon & Sutton, 1997); Qualcomm developed its revolutionary mirasol® color
display technology by studying the microstructures of Morpho butterfly wings (GrahamRowe, 2008). Nevertheless, the explorative strategy is often a risky one to follow. The
value of distant knowledge is often difficult to ascertain not only due to its relative
unfamiliarity, but also because its expected payoff is subject to much uncertainty. For
example, when the desired outcome of an explorative knowledge acquisition strategy is a
novel and game-changing technology, many variables beyond a single organization’s
control may turn out to be critical, such as market and customer acceptance of the
technology, the adoption and diffusion of it, and competitors’ strategic actions (Fleming,
2001; Rosenberg, 1996).
The choice between exploitative and explorative knowledge acquisition strategies
is a difficult one for organizations not only due to the trade-offs discussed above, but
perhaps most importantly, because organizations have limited resources such that pouring
resources into one strategy often means depriving the other (March, 1991). Furthermore,
in deciding on knowledge acquisition strategies in general, there are other factors to
consider, such as whether knowledge stickiness would be a significant impediment
(Szulanski, 2003), whether the organization is equipped with the right structure for the
choice of strategy (Nickerson & Zenger, 2005), whether the competitive environment in
which the organization operates is a better fit for one strategy versus another, and
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relatedly, whether it is even possible to accurately infer the state of the environment
(Posen & Levinthal, 2012).
1.2. Framework: Absorptive capacity, knowledge acquisition strategy, and outcome
Despite the aforementioned variety of considerations, one unifying assumption in
evaluating the choice between exploitative and explorative knowledge acquisition
strategies is that the former will indeed result in the accumulation of local knowledge,
and the latter distant knowledge. This assumption is worth revisiting, however, because
in reality the implementation of a knowledge acquisition strategy does not always lead to
its intended outcome. Organizations often deliberately seek distant knowledge only to
find themselves acquiring local knowledge yet again. As documented by Monteiro
(2009), many multinational corporations attempt to acquire distant knowledge through
their subsidiaries around the globe and yet are frequently unable to convert on the
opportunities to do so. Conversely, organizations that deliberately focus on local
knowledge sometimes find themselves successfully acquiring and even developing new
knowledge in a completely different domain. For example, Kao’s local knowledge of
surfactant (soap) technologies led it to develop a better coating for floppy disks
(Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). These instances thus raise the interesting question of
whether the path to distant knowledge is sometimes paved by an exploitative knowledge
acquisition strategy, and vice versa.
Absorptive capacity is my guiding framework in investigating this question. Of
the different components of its definition, i.e., the ability to evaluate, acquire, and apply
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new knowledge towards commercial ends (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), I focus on the
acquisition component. A fundamental principle in this framework is that an
organization’s absorptive capacity is shaped by the characteristics of its knowledge stock
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, Volberda, Foss, & Lyles, 2010). Learning takes place in a
cumulative fashion (Bower & Hillgard, 1981; Lindsay & Norman, 1977) such that prior
related knowledge in an organization’s knowledge stock is important for new knowledge
acquisition. The value of prior knowledge is not only due to its content per se, but also
the relevant learning skills that were accumulated as a result of prior knowledge
acquisition (Ellis, 1965; Estes, 1970).
In familiar and stable contexts, the type of prior related knowledge that is
important for successful knowledge acquisition tends to be clear, whereas in novel and
uncertain contexts, it tends to be difficult to predict ex-ante (Tushman & Anderson,
1986). In the latter, diversity in a knowledge stock can thus become a source of
competitive advantage. As Cohen & Levinthal (1990:131) explained: “In a setting in
which there is uncertainty about the knowledge domains from which potentially useful
information may emerge, a diverse background provides a more robust basis for learning
because it increases the prospect that incoming information will relate to what is already
known. In addition to strengthening assimilative powers, knowledge diversity also
facilitates the innovative process by enabling the individual to make novel associations
and linkages.”

18

The absorptive capacity framework allows us to surmise that an exploitative
organization is likely to be successful in the early stage of its knowledge acquisition
attempts because its choice of new knowledge rarely strays far from its prior knowledge.
Such an exploitative organization is able to quickly amass a large body of closely related
knowledge. It may then be able to use it to acquire increasingly distant knowledge, one
step at a time. It is also possible, however, that such an exploitative organization ends up
becoming a prisoner of its own knowledge, never generating enough diversity in its
knowledge stock to venture beyond local knowledge. An explorative organization, on the
other hand, can be expected to have some difficulty acquiring knowledge in its earlier
attempts. This difficulty may persist such that it becomes permanently stuck as a poor
acquirer of knowledge. An alternative and more optimistic outlook is that it may
eventually accumulate a diverse enough knowledge base to improve future acquisition
success. Which of these alternative scenarios plays out likely depends on factors beyond
absorptive capacity itself.
For instance, the outcome of a knowledge acquisition strategy likely depends on
the characteristics of the environment (Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003). As intuition
would suggest, an explorative strategy would not work well in a knowledge acquisition
environment that does not offer diverse knowledge; an explorative organization in such
an environment simply would not be able to satisfy its appetite for distant knowledge.
Similarly, an exploitative strategy might not work well in a knowledge acquisition
environment that is too diverse; an exploitative organization in such an environment
might have difficulty finding new knowledge that is local enough in relation to its
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existing knowledge stock. It should also be noted, however, that when the knowledge
acquisition environment is more diverse, an exploitative organization might also be able
to find knowledge that is more local to its existing knowledge stock.
Diversity of new knowledge in a knowledge acquisition environment is
sometimes a function of density (cf. Hansen & Haas, 2001), which can be understood as
volume of knowledge per unit space and time. Density implies the availability of options:
At the most fundamental level, it allows an organization to acquire any new knowledge at
all. A barren environment of very low density can inhibit knowledge acquisition
irrespective of strategy. Conversely, assuming non-zero level of diversity, greater density
in a knowledge acquisition environment improves the chances that an organization can
find what it truly prefers. In a high-density environment, an exploitative organization is
likely to be able to find knowledge that is extremely close to its existing knowledge
stock, whereas an explorative organization is likely to be able to find knowledge that is
extremely distant to its existing knowledge stock.
By investigating the interrelationships among knowledge acquisition strategy,
knowledge stock, absorptive capacity, and knowledge acquisition environment, I
contribute to the organizational learning literature on at least two fronts: First, I offer
insights on why there is sometimes a discrepancy between knowledge acquisition
strategy, which implies an intended outcome, and actual outcome. Second, I unpack the
mechanism of knowledge acquisition to show how a particular knowledge stock
configuration is generated over time. While various streams of research have
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demonstrated the link between knowledge stock characteristics and organizational
performance (e.g., Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), less is
known about how to obtain a desired knowledge stock configuration.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In §2 below, I discuss in greater
detail the mechanism of knowledge acquisition and explain how it translates into my
computational model. In §3, I present the model specifications. In §4, I present my
simulation experiments and results. In §5, I discuss some limitations and possible
extensions of the model.
2. The mechanism of knowledge acquisition
Figure 1 summarizes three main processes in my conceptual model: First, an
organization’s knowledge stock and knowledge acquisition strategy co-determine its
knowledge choice. Second, the organization’s knowledge stock determines whether the
chosen knowledge can be successfully acquired. Third, if the attempted acquisition is
successful, the newly acquired knowledge contributes to and reshapes the organization’s
knowledge stock. As shown in the figure, I highlight the role of absorptive capacity in the
second process.2 It represents the organization’s ability to actually acquire knowledge
that it chooses to acquire.
----- Insert Figure 1 about here -----

2

Absorptive capacity also plays a role in the first and third process, i.e., the evaluation of new knowledge
and the assimilation of newly acquired knowledge into an organization’s knowledge stock, but this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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2.1. Distance sensitivity
In my model, absorptive capacity is primarily a function of the distance between
the organization’s new knowledge of choice and its existing knowledge stock. The
greater the distance, the more difficult the new knowledge is to acquire (Pennings &
Harianto, 1992). Several factors may modulate this relationship. For example, different
knowledge acquisition contexts may render absorptive capacity more or less sensitive to
distance; prior related knowledge may be more or less crucial for acquisition success in
some disciplines or circumstances than in others. Knowledge acquisition in basic science,
for instance, typically requires more closely related knowledge compared to knowledge
acquisition in applied science (Page, 2007: 119-127). Sensitivity to distance may also be
influenced by certain organizational characteristics distinct from sheer knowledge stock,
such as material resources, prior experience with knowledge search, network position,
combinative capability, organizational form, organizational size, and group
characteristics within the organization (Almeida, Dokko, & Rosenkopf, 2003; Fosfuri &
Tribó, 2008; Haas, 2006; Haas, 2010; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Powell, Koput, &
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Van den Bosch, Volberda, & Boer,
1999).
I assign a parameter called distance sensitivity to take into account such factors
that can influence the sensitivity of absorptive capacity to distance. As such, given
greater distance sensitivity, an exploitative organization would be much more likely to
prefer and successfully acquire more local knowledge; and when it does try to acquire
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distant knowledge, it is unlikely to succeed. Conversely, given greater distance
sensitivity, an explorative organization would be much more likely to prefer more distant
knowledge. The twist, however, is that it is unlikely to succeed at acquiring it.
2.2. Learning curve: Magnitude and age
Independent of distance to new knowledge, the intrinsic characteristics of an
organization’s knowledge stock itself also matters for absorptive capacity. Research on
learning curve suggests two main factors influence the ease of knowledge acquisition and
thus absorptive capacity: the magnitude and age of existing knowledge (Darr, Argote, &
Epple, 1995; Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Hayes & Clark, 1986; Yelle, 1979).
2.2.1. Magnitude sensitivity
Knowledge magnitude is a function of repeated engagement. Not all types of
knowledge in an organization’s knowledge stock get accessed or utilized with equal
frequency or intensity; an organization tends to engage with certain types of knowledge
more intensively than with others (Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). In
some contexts, the types of knowledge that enjoy a greater level of engagement may
become more influential in driving the organization’s knowledge acquisition outcome.
For instance, repeated engagement with knowledge via deliberate practice is perhaps
more critical for further knowledge acquisition in a large airline than in a small
technology startup; the former organization operates in a complex yet relatively stable
landscape, in which knowledge domains tend to have more precise and enduring
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interrelationships, whereas the latter operates in a rapidly changing landscape, in which
knowledge domains and their interrelationships are constantly being redefined (Posen &
Levinthal, 2012).
To take into account the effect of engagement on absorptive capacity, I assign a
magnitude sensitivity parameter. Assuming positive distance sensitivity, an exploitative
organization whose knowledge acquisition context is characterized by greater magnitude
sensitivity would be much more likely to prefer and successfully acquire knowledge that
is more local and with which it has engaged more. Conversely, an explorative
organization in the same context would be much more likely to prefer knowledge that is
more distant and with which it has engaged less. Like the exploitative organization,
however, such an explorative organization would still be much more likely to
successfully acquire local knowledge with which it has engaged more.
2.2.2. Age sensitivity
Knowledge age is defined as the temporal distance between the present and the
time of acquisition. Organizations presumably do not have infinitely persistent and
reliable memory; knowledge tends to depreciate over time due to individual memory
deterioration, imperfections in knowledge management systems, and employee turnover
(Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995). Furthermore, recency of knowledge in the knowledge
stock also tends to influence attention and preference (Levitt & March, 1988). Variance
in these factors suggests that an organization’s absorptive capacity may be more or less
sensitive to the age of knowledge in its knowledge stock.
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To take into account the effect of knowledge age on absorptive capacity, I assign
a parameter called age sensitivity. An exploitative organization with greater age
sensitivity would thus be much more likely to prefer and acquire new knowledge that is
more local, particularly in relation to its more recently acquired existing knowledge. An
explorative organization with greater age sensitivity, on the other hand, would be much
more likely to prefer but less likely to successfully acquire new knowledge that is more
distant, particularly in relation to its more recently acquired existing knowledge.
2.3. Effects of knowledge acquisition environment diversity on absorptive capacity
Diversity of the knowledge acquisition environment is expected to influence
absorptive capacity differently with regards to distance sensitivity, magnitude sensitivity,
and age sensitivity. I explain each relationship below:
2.3.1. Environment diversity and distance sensitivity
In a more diverse knowledge acquisition environment, an exploitative
organization can choose and then attempt to acquire knowledge that is more local to its
existing knowledge stock. Conversely, an explorative organization can choose and then
attempt to acquire knowledge that is more distant to its existing knowledge stock. The
expected effect of environment diversity on the acquisition success of these opposing
strategies is thus straightforward: Greater diversity will result in greater acquisition
success for exploitative organizations, but it will hurt explorative organizations.
2.3.2. Environment diversity and magnitude sensitivity
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In a more diverse knowledge acquisition environment, any organization,
irrespective of strategy, is expected to have greater difficulty repeatedly engaging with a
single type of knowledge. Given some positive value of magnitude sensitivity, greater
environment diversity thus lowers the probability of acquisition success. When both
magnitude sensitivity and distance sensitivity are positive, greater environment diversity
should hurt the explorative organization even more since now it is even less likely to
repeatedly engage with a single type of knowledge.
2.3.3. Environment diversity and age sensitivity
As long as distance sensitivity is zero, greater diversity together with age
sensitivity should have no impact on acquisition success for any type of strategy. When
both distance sensitivity and age sensitivity are positive, however, greater environment
diversity should hurt the explorative organization because now it is more likely to choose
and then fail to acquire more distant knowledge. This subsequently increases the
likelihood that it has no recently acquired knowledge in its knowledge stock, which
further hurts its probability of future acquisition success. The opposite is expected for the
exploitative organization: Greater environment diversity allows it to successfully choose
and acquire more local knowledge. This subsequently increases the likelihood that it
always has recently acquired knowledge in its knowledge stock, which improves its
probability of future acquisition success.
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3. Model specifications
The model is composed of a nested hierarchy of three components: (1) a
knowledge universe, which stores information about the relatedness of all knowledge
domains, (2) a knowledge acquisition environment, which contains a subset of the
knowledge universe, and (3) an agent (i.e., an organization) that operates inside the
knowledge acquisition environment and possesses its own knowledge stock. Figure 2
provides an illustrative overview of these three components.
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----3.1. Knowledge universe
The knowledge universe is a map that represents the network of connections
among all knowledge domains. The map thus provides some information about how far
apart or closely related a given pair of knowledge domains is.
The model assumes that the knowledge universe is a true map. In other words, it
is not subject to an agent’s perception or mental model. As such, there is only one
knowledge universe. An agent has only an imperfect idea about where various
neighborhoods of knowledge domains are located and how they are organized. The extent
to which an agent understands the map is a function of the agent’s own knowledge stock.
For example, if an agent possesses some knowledge about nanotechnology, then the
agent should have some idea about where the neighborhood of nanotechnology is located
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relative to other neighboring knowledge domains, and a less clear idea about knowledge
domains that are further away.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the knowledge universe takes the form of an undirected,
scale-free network that is generated via a preferential attachment process (Barabási &
Albert, 1999). The growth process starts with an initial network of two connected nodes.
New nodes are then added to this network one at a time. Each new node selects an
existing node to which it then connects.3 The probability 𝑝! that an existing node 𝑖 gets
selected by the new node is proportional to node 𝑖’s degree 𝑘! , such that:
𝑝! =

!!
! !
!!! !

[1]

where 𝑛 is the number of existing nodes in the knowledge universe network at the time 𝑝!
is calculated. New nodes continue to be added to the network until the total number of
nodes equals to 𝑁. 𝑁 is thus the size of the knowledge universe.
My choice of representing the knowledge universe as a scale-free network that is
grown via preferential attachment is based on two reasons: First, a large body of
empirical research has demonstrated that two classes of knowledge-related networks—
information and collaboration networks—frequently have a scale-free topology. Some
examples of such networks are: the World Wide Web (Barabási, Albert, & Jeong, 2000),
Wikipedia entries (Cappoci, Servedio, Colaiori, Buriol, Donato, Leonardi, & Caldarelli,

3

A consequence of this process is that there is no isolate or “island” in the model. Since it is difficult to
imagine a knowledge domain in reality that is completely isolated from everything else, this feature of the
model appears reasonable.
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2006), scientific co-authorships (Newman, 2001a; Newman, 2001b), and Hollywood actor
collaborations (Barabási & Albert, 1999).
Second, preferential attachment appears to be a reasonable mechanism for
describing the growth and evolution of a knowledge network. Knowledge presumably
evolves in a “rich-get-richer” manner. Knowledge domains that have a relatively large
number of connections to other domains tend to be more visible and well-understood
such that they are more likely to become the building blocks for the development of
future knowledge domains.
Given that the knowledge universe is represented as a network, it is important to
clarify what the nodes and links represent: The nodes represent knowledge domains, and
the links represent the relevance between knowledge domains. Based on Gorayska and
Lindsay’s (1993) work, I define relevance in terms of functional relationships: Two
knowledge domains are relevant to each other if one contains a means to some end that is
embedded in the other. For example, evolutionary biology is relevant to organizational
studies because it contains some concepts that help to accomplish the goals of
organizational studies. The knowledge universe can thus be interpreted as a complete
historical record of functional relationships among knowledge domains.
The definition of a knowledge domain—and therefore what a node represents—is
more difficult to pin down: How granular does a knowledge domain need to be?
Fortunately, the choice of scale-free topology offers a convenient solution: A scale-free
network is self-similar (Song, Havlin, & Makse, 2005) such that the issue of granularity
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can be assumed away. If one were to zoom in to a neighborhood in the knowledge
universe, that neighborhood would appear to have a structure that is similar to the
structure of the overall knowledge universe. The generalizability of a conclusion drawn
based on the knowledge universe is thus minimally compromised regardless of whether a
node represents an entire discipline (such as management), a sub-discipline (such as
operations), or a specific topic (such as just-in-time systems). Finally, it is important to
note that my choice of representing knowledge domains as nodes in a network assumes
that knowledge domains are generally comparable units.
3.2. Knowledge acquisition environment
The knowledge acquisition environment represents the knowledge space in which
an agent can acquire knowledge. The knowledge acquisition environment consists of
knowledge units, each of which has a location or “address” in the knowledge universe.
(These knowledge units are thus simply replicas of a subset of nodes from the knowledge
universe. In other words, each knowledge unit in the knowledge acquisition environment
has a “parent node” in the knowledge universe.) The knowledge units are spatially
scattered in the knowledge acquisition environment as unattached nodes, and their
locations in the knowledge acquisition environment are independent of their parent
nodes’ locations in the knowledge universe (Figure 2).
When discussing knowledge in the knowledge acquisition environment, I use the
term “unit” rather than “domain” for two reasons: First, the word “domain” implies a
positional property of knowledge relative to other knowledge; in the knowledge
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acquisition environment, however, this property is not directly observable. Second,
because there can be many replicas of the same knowledge domain in the knowledge
acquisition environment, it would be imprecise to call each replica a knowledge domain.
Some real-world correlates of the knowledge acquisition environment are
industries and geographic regions in which an organization operates. The knowledge
acquisition environment can, however, have a broader and more abstract meaning. For
example, the set of publications to which an organization subscribes or the set of alliance
partners with which an organization interacts can also make up the agent’s knowledge
acquisition environment. The knowledge acquisition environment therefore has an agentcentric interpretation. (Although this does not necessarily imply that an agent has much
control over the content of the knowledge acquisition environment.)
In the model, the knowledge acquisition environment is represented as a twodimensional lattice of a fixed area (Figure 2). It has a density E; which is simply the total
number of knowledge units that the knowledge acquisition environment contains since
the area is of a fixed size.4 The knowledge acquisition environment is set up according to
a simple procedure: A node in the knowledge universe is randomly chosen to be
replicated as a new knowledge unit in the knowledge acquisition environment, and this
new knowledge unit is given a random (x, y) coordinate. This process is repeated until
there are a total of E knowledge units in the knowledge acquisition environment. Each
node in the knowledge universe can be replicated more than once, such that there may be
4

I choose to use the label density rather than volume because density leads to a better intuition about the
agent’s susceptibility to encountering new knowledge units in the environment.
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multiple copies of knowledge units in the knowledge acquisition environment that have
the same parent node. According to this procedure, greater density implies greater
diversity of knowledge units in the knowledge acquisition environment.
3.3. Agent
The agent represents an organization that first chooses and then attempts to
acquire knowledge in the knowledge acquisition environment based on its knowledge
stock. I explain each step below:
3.3.1. Knowledge choice
The agent is assigned one of two knowledge acquisition strategies: exploitative or
explorative. At t = 0, the agent occupies a random (x, y) coordinate in the knowledge
acquisition environment, and its knowledge stock is seeded with one initial knowledge
unit. At each subsequent time point, the agent moves in a random direction in the
knowledge acquisition environment. The agent then surveys all knowledge units within
its radius of vision. Here, the radius of vision is fixed and set based on practical
considerations; it is not so large that the simulation becomes too computationally
demanding, but not so small that the agent does not have enough distinct knowledge units
to survey at a given time point.
The agent assigns a probability 𝑝! to each knowledge unit v within its radius of
vision. The value of 𝑝! corresponds to the probability that the agent prefers knowledge
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unit 𝑣 over all other knowledge unit 𝑤 within the agent’s radius of vision; 𝑝! is described
by the following equation:

𝑝! =   

! !!!
!
!!!
!!! !

  , −1 ≤ 𝑛   ≤ 1

[2]

where 𝑉 is the total number of knowledge units within the agent’s radius of vision, 𝑛 is a
constant, and 𝐿! (or 𝐿! ) is knowledge unit 𝑣’s (or w’s) distance (average path length)
from all parent nodes of the knowledge units in the agent’s knowledge stock. The
constant 𝑛 can take a value between -1 and +1. For simplicity, if the agent’s knowledge
preference is exploitative, then 𝑛 takes a value -1, such that 𝑝! decreases as a function of
𝐿! . And if the agent’s knowledge preference is explorative, then 𝑛 takes a value of +1,
such that 𝑝! increases as a function of 𝐿! .
The computation of 𝐿! (and by analogy, 𝐿! ) takes into account the magnitude and
age of the knowledge units in the agent’s knowledge stock as described by the following
equation:

𝐿! =   

!
! ! !! !
!
! .!
!
!!! !!" .!
!
! ! !! !
!
! .!
!
!!! !

  , 𝑐! ≥ 1, 𝑎! ≥ 0

[3]

Here, 𝑙!"   is the path length between the parent node of knowledge unit 𝑣 and the parent
node of knowledge unit 𝑖 in the agent’s knowledge stock, and 𝑆 is the total number of
knowledge units in the agent’s knowledge stock. The term 𝑒 !

!

!!   assigns

a weight to 𝑙!" ;

𝑐! is the number of copies (i.e., magnitude) of knowledge unit 𝑖 in the agent’s knowledge
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stock, and 𝑔 is the magnitude sensitivity parameter. The term 𝑒 !!! ! assigns a weight to
𝑙!" ; 𝑎! is the age of knowledge unit 𝑖 in the agent’s knowledge stock, and 𝑓 is the age
sensitivity parameter.
After each knowledge unit v in the agent’s radius of vision gets assigned a
probability 𝑝! , the agent runs a lottery based on the resulting probability distribution to
choose a knowledge unit 𝑗 that it will attempt to acquire. In other words, knowledge unit
𝑗 is the agent’s preferred knowledge unit.
3.3.2. Knowledge acquisition
The agent assigns a probability 𝑝! to knowledge unit 𝑗. The value of 𝑝!
corresponds to the probability that the agent can actually acquire knowledge unit 𝑗; 𝑝! is
described by:

𝑝! = 1 −

!
!!!

1 −    𝑒 !

!!!"   !  

!

!! !  !!!   

  

[4]

where 𝑘 is the distance sensitivity parameter, 𝑔 is the magnitude sensitivity parameter,
and 𝑓 the age sensitivity parameter. 𝐿!" is knowledge unit 𝑗’s distance from the parent
node of a knowledge unit 𝑖 in the agent’s knowledge stock.
4. Simulations
Based on the model specifications above, I run simulations to compare the two
types of agents: exploitative and explorative. In all simulations, I keep track of two
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measures: acquisition success rate, which indicates whether an agent is able to acquire
the knowledge unit that it chooses at each time point, and average path length of the
knowledge units in the agent’s knowledge stock, which is a proxy for diversity. I first
establish baseline results by comparing the two types of agents as well as varying levels
of environment density (which is correlated with diversity), all while setting the
knowledge acquisition parameters of distance sensitivity 𝑘, magnitude sensitivity 𝑔, and
age sensitivity 𝑓 to zero. I then vary each knowledge acquisition parameter individually
and subsequently co-vary them with each other as well as with levels of environment
density.
4.1. Baseline
The baseline results are as expected, which indicates that my model is set up
appropriately. The exploitative and explorative agents show no difference in terms of
acquisition success rate. Since distance sensitivity 𝑘 is set to zero, acquisition success
probability is independent of the distance between the agent’s new knowledge of choice
and the agent’s existing knowledge stock. In terms of average path length, both agents’
knowledge stocks show an increasing pattern in the initial periods, but they quickly settle
into a steady state (after ~15 periods), with the explorative agent settling at a higher
average path length than the exploitative agent.
The effect of environment density is also straightforward: greater density means
greater availability of knowledge units for agents to choose and subsequently acquire at
each time step, which would improve acquisition success rate. Furthermore, greater
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environment density allows the exploitative agent to choose and then acquire knowledge
that is more local to its existing knowledge stock, thereby lowering its average path
length. Similarly, greater environment density allows the explorative agent to choose and
then acquire knowledge that is more distant to its existing knowledge stock, thereby
increasing its average path length.
4.2. Distance sensitivity
When distance sensitivity is positive, the exploitative agent performs better than
the explorative agent in terms of acquisition success rate (Figure 3A). This is as expected,
given that the exploitative agent chooses knowledge that is more local to its existing
knowledge stock and thus easier to acquire. As such, distance sensitivity lowers both
acquisition success rate and average path length for both exploitative and explorative
agents. When distance sensitivity is low, the explorative agent enjoys an advantage over
the exploitative agent in terms of average path length. As distance sensitivity becomes
very large, however, this advantage diminishes since now the explorative agent is very
likely to fail in acquiring distant knowledge (Figure 3B).
Greater environment density has opposite effects for exploitative and explorative
agents. For the exploitative agent, greater environment density improves acquisition
success rate as it allows the agent to choose and subsequently try to acquire more local
knowledge. Consequently, the exploitative agent’s average path length decreases with
greater environment density as well. For the explorative agent, greater environment
density hurts acquisition success rate as it allows the agent to choose and subsequently
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acquire more distant knowledge. The effect of environment density on the explorative
agent’s average path length is non-monotonic: Environment density increases the agent’s
average path length up to a point, but as environment density gets very high, the agent
becomes very likely to choose and (unsuccessfully) attempt to acquire very distant
knowledge, such that its knowledge stock consists mostly of relatively local knowledge,
which results in a low average path length.
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ----4.3. Magnitude sensitivity
When magnitude sensitivity is positive, acquisition success depends on prior
repeated engagements with a particular knowledge unit. (In the model, such repeated
engagements are represented in the agent’s knowledge stock as multiple copies of
knowledge units that come from the same parent node.) A positive magnitude sensitivity
parameter thus creates a type of “friction” that slows down knowledge acquisition: The
greater the magnitude sensitivity, the more an agent has to have repeatedly engaged with
a particular knowledge unit in order to reach a given acquisition success probability.
When magnitude sensitivity is very high, an agent can thus become permanently stuck
with a low acquisition success probability.
Consistent with the reasoning above, my results show that greater magnitude
sensitivity lowers acquisition success rate for all agents for a given time point, though it
does not necessarily lower the final acquisition rate since all agents can reach (and settle
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into) ~100% acquisition success rate after many periods. When distance sensitivity is set
to zero, positive magnitude sensitivity yields no significant difference between
exploitative and explorative agents in terms of acquisition success rate. When distance
sensitivity is positive, however, for a given magnitude sensitivity value, the exploitative
agent wins over the explorative agent (Figure 4A). This is because the exploitative agent
is now much more likely than the explorative agent to repeatedly engage with a particular
knowledge unit. Greater magnitude sensitivity has a similar effect on average path length:
It lowers average path length for all agents for a given time point, but it does not
necessarily lower the final average path length for agents with the same knowledge
acquisition strategy. When distance sensitivity is positive, however, greater magnitude
sensitivity lowers the agent’s average path length throughout all periods (Figure 4B),
since now the acquisition probability favors not only knowledge units with which the
agent has repeatedly engaged, but also those that are more local to the agent’s existing
knowledge stock.
----- Insert Figure 4 about here ----Greater environment density has straightforward effects on both acquisition
success rate and average path length: Greater environment density offers more choice,
such that it becomes more difficult for an agent to repeatedly engage with the same
knowledge unit, which in turn hurts acquisition success probability. In terms of average
path length, greater environment density offers more extremes, both very local and very
distant knowledge, such that it translates into lower average path length for the
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exploitative agent and higher average path length for the explorative agent. These effects
are simply due to the agent’s baseline differences; there is no meaningful interaction
effect on acquisition success rate or average path length between environment density
and magnitude sensitivity.
4.4. Age sensitivity
When age sensitivity is positive, the presence of recently acquired knowledge
units in the knowledge stock is important for acquisition success. If an agent fails to
acquire a knowledge unit in a given period, the agent’s acquisition success probability in
the next period is hurt. Thus, as long as the chance of an agent acquiring a knowledge
unit in a given period is less than one, greater age sensitivity should translate into lower
acquisition success rate for all agents. My simulation results are consistent with this
reasoning.
When distance sensitivity is set to zero, positive age sensitivity yields no
significant difference between exploitative and explorative agents in terms of acquisition
success rate. In terms of average path length, the exploitative agent is lower than the
explorative agent, but this is due to baseline differences rather than age sensitivity. When
distance sensitivity is positive, however, positive age sensitivity amplifies the effects of
distance sensitivity both in terms of acquisition success rate and average path length.
Both of these measures are now lower than when only distance sensitivity alone is
positive (Figure 3 and Figure 5).
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----- Insert Figure 5 about here ----5. Limitations and extensions
The findings in this paper offer some insights into why knowledge acquisition
strategies sometimes do not yield their intended outcomes, in particular why an
explorative strategy may fail to accumulate diverse knowledge and even outperformed in
this regard by an exploitative strategy (e.g., as shown in Figure 4). All of the parameters
examined thus far, i.e., distance sensitivity, magnitude sensitivity, age sensitivity, as well
as environment density, have the potential to hurt the explorative strategy more than they
do the exploitative strategy. A takeaway here then is when any of the factors above is
salient, an exploitative strategy may be a safer bet in terms of achieving acquisition
success as well as diversity.
I hope that this paper contributes a systematic understanding of the
interrelationships among knowledge acquisition strategy, knowledge stock, absorptive
capacity, and knowledge acquisition environment. More specifically, the computational
model presented in this paper offers some building blocks for future research on the roles
of knowledge stock configuration in organizational learning, an important construct that
may be challenging to study in the empirical setting alone.
Nevertheless, the findings in this paper reflect modeling choices and inevitably
trade-offs, many of which were made in favor of tractability and at the expense of scope.
I discuss below some limitations that result from those choices, the corresponding
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opportunities for extensions, and their potential contributions to the organizational
learning literature:
5.1. Static vs. dynamic knowledge universe
The knowledge universe, which describes the relationship between knowledge
domains, does not change throughout the course of the simulations described in this
paper. New connections are never added, and existing connections are never severed.
Likewise, new nodes are never added, and existing nodes are never deleted. The static
nature of the knowledge universe in this paper implies that knowledge domains and their
relationships to each other are constant, which of course is a simplification of a
dynamically evolving reality.
A research question that cannot be answered using the current model is thus: How
would knowledge acquisition strategies fare as the relationships between knowledge
domains change? The state of knowledge may be rapidly evolving due to, for instance,
new scientific discoveries, new technological developments, or new social conventions.
A dynamic rather than static knowledge universe would first of all affect the diversity
measure of an agent’s knowledge stock; two knowledge units that used to be distant may
now be considered closely related, and vice versa. Indirectly, this would change an
agent’s realized knowledge preference and subsequently acquisition success rate. For
example, an exploitative agent that has accumulated a set of closely related knowledge
units in its knowledge stock may suddenly find itself endowed instead with a relatively
diverse knowledge stock, such that in continuing to pursue an exploitative strategy, it
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would prefer new knowledge units that are closely related to any of the knowledge units
in its newly diverse knowledge stock. Effectively, it may end up applying a “broad yet
deep” approach to knowledge acquisition.
The brief analytical exercise above is intended merely to illustrate some possible
consequences of modifying the knowledge map from static to dynamic. The particular
manners according to which the parameters of the knowledge map are modified would
presumably lead to qualitatively different implications, some of which may be too
complex to predict analytically and thus need to be observed experimentally. The
relationship between strategy and changing environment is an issue that has always been
intriguing and relevant to both scholars and practitioners (e.g., Grant, 2003; Kraatz &
Zajac, 2001; Posen & Levinthal, 2012), and so this particular extension of the model is a
compelling one.
5.2. Density vs. diversity of the knowledge acquisition environment
In the current model, the knowledge acquisition environment is populated with
knowledge units that are randomly selected from among the knowledge domains in the
knowledge universe (as explained in §3.2). Accordingly, the diversity of the knowledge
acquisition environment is measured using density as a proxy rather than directly.
This modeling choice serves two purposes: first, it helps to minimize the number
of parameters (and importantly, the number of their combinations) that need to be
systematically varied and analyzed, and second, it helps to maintain the focus of this
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paper on knowledge acquisition strategy rather than on environment parameters.
Nevertheless, density is clearly an imperfect proxy for diversity. A knowledge acquisition
environment that contains a small volume of every knowledge domain is not easily
comparable to one that contains some volume of only a few knowledge domains.
A straightforward extension would ameliorate this problem: A diversity parameter
could be added to the model such that the knowledge acquisition environment is
described by two distinct parameters: density and diversity. The density parameter would
simply determine how many knowledge units are available in the knowledge acquisition
environment, whereas the diversity parameter would determine the collective distance
between knowledge units in the knowledge acquisition environment.5
Keeping diversity constant, the primary effect of greater density is that it
increases the number of copies of a particular knowledge domain that are available in the
knowledge acquisition environment. As such, a dense knowledge acquisition
environment essentially facilitates repeated engagement with a particular knowledge
domain. A dedicated density parameter is thus likely to interact most noticeably with the
magnitude sensitivity parameter; given a positive magnitude sensitivity value, agents of
either knowledge acquisition strategy would have greater difficulty acquiring knowledge
as the knowledge acquisition environment becomes less dense, and this effect is likely to
be worse for the explorative agent when low density is combined with high diversity,
5

Note that while density and diversity as described here are distinct parameters, diversity to some extent
depends on density: A given level of diversity requires a minimum level of density. For example, if fifty
different knowledge domains are to be represented in the knowledge acquisition environment, then the
density parameter needs to allow at least fifty knowledge units to be present in the knowledge acquisition
environment.
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because such an agent would attempt to acquire distant knowledge with which it also has
minimally engaged. As this brief analytical exercise suggests, the separation of density
and diversity parameters from each other could provide a more precise understanding of
what drives a particular effect.
Keeping density constant, the primary effect of greater diversity is that it
increases the number of distinct knowledge domains that are represented in the
knowledge acquisition environment. A diverse knowledge acquisition environment
allows the explorative agent to find distant knowledge domains to try to acquire, but of
course this may also lower its acquisition success rate. The effect of a dedicated diversity
parameter should essentially be very similar to the findings in this paper. Nevertheless,
the separation of density and diversity parameters from each other again could help to tell
apart the primary and secondary drivers of a particular effect.
5.3. Static vs. dynamic knowledge acquisition strategy
Agents in the current model are not allowed to switch strategies during the
simulation; they are either exploitative or explorative from start to finish. A natural
extension of this feature is thus to allow agents to be able to switch strategies during the
simulation, either once or multiple times. Not only would it be an interesting analytical
exercise to explore the possibility that there is a formula for an optimal strategy, it would
also reflect the reality of strategy-making in practice. Organizations constantly oscillate
between (or even simultaneously pursue) exploitative and explorative modes, and so it is
of practical interest to understand how such choices can be better managed.
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The findings in this paper in general point towards the hazards of pursuing an
exclusively explorative strategy, but allowing agents to switch strategy could bring the
merits of the explorative strategy into the foreground. As discussed in §1.2, one argument
for pursuing the explorative strategy is that it could provide organizations with an
increasingly diverse knowledge base such that knowledge acquisition becomes easier
overall over time. This effect may be more readily observable if agents are allowed to
switch to an exploitative strategy once they have acquired a sufficiently diverse
knowledge stock. The definition of “sufficiently diverse” here is one that likely has to be
determined experimentally.
5.4. Conclusion
In conclusion, the full potential of the current model has certainly not been
exhaustively explored in this paper. The extensions discussed above are chosen for their
immediate relevance, but there are other less obvious ones that are similarly promising,
such as the possibility of introducing multi-agent cooperation, which perhaps could be
used to study the use of knowledge in teams or alliances, or agent acquisition, which
perhaps could be used to study the knowledge combination and recombination aspects of
mergers and acquisitions. Evidently, while the current model is presented only in its most
basic form, its structural pieces are hopefully proving to be sound enough to allow for the
construction of more complex models that are suitable of answering a variety of
important research questions in the organizational learning literature.

45

CHAPTER 3

THE ARRANGEMENT OF CAUSALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
EVENT PREDICTABILITY
1. Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in research in forecasting is: What does it
take to make the most accurate predictions possible? There are two sides to event
predictability. The first concerns the characteristics of events themselves: What is it about
events that determines their inherent predictability? The second concerns the
characteristics of the forecasting mechanisms employed: What is it about those
forecasting mechanisms that influences their prediction accuracy? This paper is about
bringing together the two sides: I present a computational model to facilitate a theoretical
discussion about how their interaction influences event predictability.
To borrow Simon’s (1957) scissors analogy, it takes two blades to make a
forecast: One blade is the forecasting environment and the other is the forecasting
mechanism. Both the forecasting environment and the forecasting mechanism jointly
demarcate the limits of prediction accuracy. When a forecasting environment is
inherently unpredictable, forecasting mechanisms matter little. For example, it is often
difficult to tell apart luck from skill as the true explanation for success in predicting the
behavior of the financial markets (e.g., Fama, 1965; Fama & French, 2010). In such
contexts, it is difficult to say whether an accurate prediction will be made. On the other
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hand, in a forecasting environment that is inherently predictable, a forecasting
mechanism may be ignorant of its underlying causal circuitry such that events in such an
environment look less predictable than they actually are. It took doctors a long time and
many casualties before they eventually realized that dirty hands could reliably predict
fatal infections (Best & Neuhauser, 2004; Holmes, 1936). Absent this realization,
predictable patient mortality might be disguised as a random stroke of misfortune.
Undoubtedly, it is important to study both blades of the scissors. And it is perhaps
especially important to understand how the two interact. One type of forecasting
mechanism may be more capable of producing accurate predictions than others given a
set of event characteristics. Knowing when a particular forecasting mechanism has a
strong chance to shine is clearly of value in both research and practice. Researchers have
indeed underscored the importance of taking into account both the event and the
forecasting mechanism. For example, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2009) applied the idea
of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) to demonstrate that certain
environmental structures allow simple forecasting models to produce better predictions
than complex models. Tetlock (2005) and Mellers et al. (2013) together showed that the
time horizon of an event is a boundary condition for differentiating the forecast
performance of forecasters with contrasting cognitive styles (“foxes vs. hedgehogs”):
When the horizon is long (i.e., several years), foxes outperform hedgehogs, but when the
horizon is short (i.e., a few months), forecast performance does not depend on whether
the forecasters are foxes or hedgehogs.
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Notwithstanding some important insights above, data and methodological
limitations have often presented barriers to the development of theories about how
forecasting environments and forecasting mechanisms interact. Research in forecasting
has been informed more by findings on the characteristics of forecasting mechanisms
than on the characteristics of forecasting environments. This apparent imbalance is
understandable. Many variables in real-world forecasting environments are difficult to
observe or measure, which complicates characterization efforts. Furthermore, researchers
who conduct studies in naturalistic settings are generally limited in their ability to control
forecasting environments (McGrath, 1981). No event in the real world happens exactly
the same way twice (let alone enough times to produce a statistically desirable sample
size). Researchers who conduct laboratory experiments are perhaps more fortunate in this
regard. They can manipulate the world as it is presented to experimental subjects, tweak a
small number of attributes at a time, and replicate conditions as many times as needed
(McGrath, 1981). Nevertheless, experimental researchers can only complexify
experimental conditions so much before they run the risk of overwhelming their subjects,
which may in turn compromise data integrity.
This paper is intended to complement existing research in its effort to generate a
holistic understanding of event predictability. My method of choice is computational
modeling due to its ability to circumvent certain limitations of empirical studies in both
naturalistic and laboratory settings as described above. Furthermore, since one goal of
this paper is to facilitate theory development, computational modeling offers the distinct
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benefits of precision, transparency, logical consistency, and the possibility of
unanticipated implications (Adner et al., 2009).
The model in this paper is specifically designed to allow for simultaneous
manipulations of forecasting environments and forecasting mechanisms. While there are
multiple ways to define what constitutes a forecasting environment, the forecasting
environment in this paper is simply defined by the event in question itself. The attribute
of interest is the event’s causal structure, i.e., the arrangement according to which the
event’s occurrence could result from the cascading occurrences of preceding events.6 As I
later demonstrate, an event’s causal structure shapes the probability, latency, and
predictability of its occurrence. With regards to forecasting mechanisms, I draw upon the
literature on judgmental forecasting (Armstrong, 2001) and look at the different ways in
which a forecaster’s cognitive representation of an event’s causal structure may be
imperfect, which creates a discrepancy between the event’s true causal structure and the
forecaster’s perceived version. The concurrent examination of both sides ultimately
suggests how different types of imperfect cognitive representation affect prediction
accuracy differently in forecasting environments that are characterized by different causal
structures. Imperfect cognitive representations that have strong effects on prediction
accuracy given a particular causal structure may have weak ones given another.

6

I choose this narrow definition for analytical simplicity and clarity. In reality, it can be argued that a
forecasting environment consists of multiple events with correlated or overlapping attributes, of which
causal structure may be one.
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In addition to making the characteristics of forecasting environments more
prominent vis-à-vis those of forecasting mechanisms, this paper offers a contribution to
research in forecasting by directly examining the causal mechanisms that give rise to
events. In contrast, the existing literature has often been forced to treat causal
mechanisms as a black box, looking instead at correlations between cues and event
occurrences or between cues and forecasts (Armstrong, 2001; Brunswik, 1955; Castellan,
1973). Empirical research that can break open the black box is hampered, again, by
methodological challenges, as a consequence of which such research becomes more
sensitive to the availability of clear theoretical guidance. Yet, the same methodological
challenges also complicate the development of theories about causal mechanisms. It is
my hope that this paper—by utilizing an alternative methodological solution—can help to
untangle the gridlock and provide some navigational cues for researchers who wish to
look directly at the causal elements of forecasting.
2. Event predictability
2.1. Forecasting environment: The causal structure of an event
Events have causes, and those causes typically materialize in the form of
preceding events, which in turn have their own causes. In this paper, I refer to such causal
preceding events as precursors. Researchers in various domains, from artificial
intelligence to psychology to medicine, have recognized that the chain of causal
relationships that connect precursors to a focal event can be readily represented and
studied in a graphical manner. The model in this paper builds upon one of the most well50

known and widely used example of such a representation: the Bayesian network (Pearl,
1985). Each node in a Bayesian network corresponds to a focal event or a precursor that
is typically expressed as a binary variable (i.e., having one of two possible states, such as
true or false),7 and each link corresponds to some probability that a change of state in one
node causes a change of state in another node.
A simple example of a Bayesian network is shown in Figure 6 (adapted from
Pearl, 2000: 15). Here, there are four nodes: (A) it rains, (B) sprinkler is on, (C)
pavement is wet, and (D) pavement is slippery. In this network, “pavement is slippery” is
the focal event, and the others are precursors. The focal event has only one direct
precursor, which is “pavement is wet.” This precursor in turn has two direct precursors,
which are “it rains” and “sprinkler is on.” As suggested in the diagram, when an event
has only one direct precursor, that precursor is—in a logical sense—necessary. In
contrast, when an event has more than one direct precursor, none of the precursors is
necessary; rather, each can cause a change of state in the event independently of the
other. The sprinkler, for instance, could make the pavement wet on its own regardless of
whether it rains, and rain could make the pavement wet regardless of whether the
sprinkler is on. Another thing to note about the network is that a precursor is only
sufficient when its causal probability vis-à-vis the event is unity.
----- Insert Figure 6 about here -----

7

Nodes can have more than two possible states. For instance, a node that represents “season” can have four
possible values: spring, summer, fall, and winter. For simplicity, however, the scope of this paper is limited
to binary nodes.
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In this discussion of causal relationships, it is worth acknowledging for a moment
that causality is a tricky matter. Philosophers and scientists across millennia, from
Aristotle to Simon, have debated on the exact meaning of causality and the methods for
determining causal relationships (Falcon, 2012; Simon, 1977). One of the fundamental
debates in the study of causality is whether it is necessarily deterministic, or whether
there are systems in which causality is inherently probabilistic (e.g., Earman, 1986; Eells,
1991; Suppes, 1970). In this paper, as my discussion of Bayesian network above
suggests, I choose to represent causality in terms of probabilistic relationships. At the
same time, however, I intend for this paper to be agnostic with regards to whether the true
nature of causality is one or the other. Rather, my choice to represent causality
probabilistically is meant to be a practical one as it is capable of accommodating both
views. Its compatibility with the probabilistic view is straightforward, and its
compatibility with the deterministic view is possible with the assumption that
deterministic relationships can appear probabilistic due to incomplete knowledge (Eells,
1991).
The representation of an event as a network brings to the foreground the idea that
the causal mechanism that gives rise to an event can have structural signatures. In the
following subsections, I unpack this idea further and discuss how the causal structure of
an event may influence the probability, latency, and predictability of its occurrence.
These three event occurrence characteristics are some of the key dependent variables in
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this paper.8 Probability refers to the likelihood of event occurrence, either by a certain
point in time or as time goes to infinity. The latter points to the idea that some events may
simply never occur. Latency refers to how much time it takes for an event to occur, which
in the model is measured as the amount of time that passes between the first activation of
a precursor and the eventual activation of the focal event. Predictability has two possible
interpretations; it could refer to variance of event occurrence as a binary variable or to
variance of latency. In this paper, I choose the latter because latency suggests something
about event occurrence, but event occurrence as a binary variable suggests little, if
anything, about latency. Variance of latency is a more nuanced measure of predictability
than variance of event occurrence is. An event that has a one-hundred percent chance of
occurring once would still appear to be highly unpredictable if its one-time occurrence is
as likely to take place tomorrow as it is fifty or a hundred years from now.
My discussion of how an event’s causal structure may influence the probability,
latency, and predictability of its occurrence below is directly informed by the simulation
results that are later presented in detail in the technical portions of this paper (§4, §5, and
§6). It is thus both a preview and a summary of the simulation results. As Adner et al.
(2009) explain, one distinct feature of computational modeling is that it allows
researchers to be explicit and firm about their assumptions, but the implications of those
assumptions are often unforeseeable ex-ante, for instance because they are too
analytically intractable. This differs from verbal theorizing: “Most exercises in verbal
8

More specifically, they are dependent variables of the forecasting environment, i.e., the event. The
dependent variable of the forecasting mechanism is a derivative of latency, as explained in §2.3.2. Tables 1
and 2 provide an overview of the independent and dependent variables used in this paper.
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theorizing involve recognizing a relationship between two factors—say, resources and
profitability—and then trying to determine a set of assumptions that would lead to such a
relationship. In essence, one moves backwards from propositions to assumptions. A clear
disadvantage of this approach is that one cannot find the unexpected (though it may later
rear its head in empirical research testing these propositions). In contrast, formal
approaches can help the researcher identify even the most surprising and counterintuitive
implications that might follow from a set of assumptions” (Adner et al., 2009: 204). In
the same spirit, my discussion below describes how various intuitions about the
interactions between forecasting environments and forecasting mechanisms can both
inform and derive from simulation results.9
2.1.1. Number of precursors
Some events have many possible causes, while others have only a few. For
instance, one can pick among many ways to cause a traffic jam in downtown Chicago but
probably has to try very hard to cause one in rural Arizona. The “ingredients” of a traffic
jam can be readily found in downtown Chicago: vehicles, pedestrians, and traffic lights,
among others. “Traffic jam in downtown Chicago” thus has a network counterpart that
consists of many precursor nodes, which may represent preceding events of various
stages such as: “accident on Michigan Avenue,” “broken traffic lights at City Hall,” and
“minor power outage.” In contrast, the numbers of vehicles, pedestrians, and traffic lights
in rural Arizona are probably so low that few traffic jam precursors can arise.
9

Whether these intuitions turn out to be correct is of course a different matter. Just like verbal theories,
they can only be validated through rigorous empirical testing.
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Events with many precursors are on average more probable, assuming that those
precursors are actually connected by causal relationships. Each precursor is essentially a
potential trigger point, and when there are more potential trigger points, there is a greater
probability that any given potential trigger point gets activated and ends up activating the
focal event (assuming non-zero causal probability and controlling for the proportion of
links in the causal structure in relation to the number of precursors).
Moreover, the number of causal relationships among precursors tends to grow
with the number of precursors, as a result of which the activation of a precursor in a
causal structure with many precursors tends to reverberate faster and more broadly than
the activation of a precursor in a causal structure with few precursors does. This makes
event occurrence not only more probable, but also faster. Event probability is in general
inversely correlated with latency; events that are likely to occur typically also occur
sooner. The number of precursors in an event’s causal structure thus corresponds to lower
latency.
Everything else equal, events with many precursors are also on average more
predictable. A greater number of potential trigger points not only increases the likelihood
of event occurrence, it also narrows down the probability distribution of latency, which
results in a smaller variance. Precursors essentially serve as each other’s backup—if one
fails to get activated, another can take its place. In contrast, events with few precursors
are highly dependent on those particular precursors getting activated such that the
probability distribution of latency for those events tends to be wider.
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Going back to the example above, a traffic jam in downtown Chicago is thus
more likely to occur, is likely to occur sooner, and occurs more predictably than a traffic
jam in rural Arizona. This is all due to a large number of preceding events that could
(independently or semi-independently) result in a traffic jam in downtown Chicago.
2.1.2. Connectivity
2.1.2.1. Link density
Two events with similar numbers of precursors may still differ in terms of how
interconnected those precursors are. Correspondingly, two event networks with similar
numbers of nodes may have different numbers of links. As a thought experiment,
consider two hypothetical riots that have the potential to occur in two identical countries
(with identical citizens and identical governments, among other things). Given that the
conditions in which the two riots might occur are identical, it is safe to assume that the
two riots could be represented by identical network structures with identical sets of
precursors. Now, imagine that a new internet-based broadcasting tool gets introduced into
only one of the two countries. Such a tool would significantly reduce communication
friction, and the likely effect on the event network structure would be that a greater
number of links than before now connect precursors to one another. As a result, the
activation of a precursor would now reverberate faster through the network. The Arab
Spring exemplifies this concept in the real world; Twitter made it possible for the
precursors that eventually led to the wave of revolutions in the Arab world to be activated
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simultaneously and at an unprecedented speed (Lotan et al., 2011). In a Twitter-powered
world, event precursors are more interconnected than before.
Everything else equal, events characterized by greater link density are on average
more probable. Precursor activation in such events is more “contagious” such that there is
a greater likelihood for the focal event to get activated. For the same reason, events with
greater link density also tend to have a lower latency. Whether greater link density makes
events more predictable is more complicated. As discussed later in §4.4.1.1 and §4.4.2.1,
simulation results show that while greater link density does correspond to greater
predictability, the explanation for it is nuanced and rather technical: The variance of
event latency in a network depends on a number of factors such as the number of
activation “steps” (i.e., path length) that separates the trigger point from the focal event
and the number of alternative paths that exist between the trigger point and the focal
event. Furthermore, if the specific trigger point is unknown, the variance of path length
between each possible trigger point and the focal event also needs to be taken into
account. Similarly, if the exact causal structure of the event is unknown, the spectrum of
possible structures needs to be considered.
2.1.2.2. Causal probability
Controlling for number of precursors and link density, some events are connected
to their precursors via strong causal relationships, while others via weak ones. “Strong”
and “weak” here refer to the probability that precursor activations do lead to event
occurrence. To illustrate this, let us compare an event involving the common cold to that
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involving Ebola. For the purpose of this illustration, let us assume that both diseases are
similarly contagious, similarly infectious, and that they are transmitted in more or less
identical ways.10 Based on this assumption, the events of “someone catching a cold” and
“someone catching the Ebola fever” can be represented by network structures that are
highly similar to each other in terms of number of precursors, link density, and link
arrangement. Nevertheless, because Ebola is clearly a very serious disease, there are strict
measures in place to contain any cases of infection. In contrast, because the common cold
has mild consequences, comparatively few regulations exist to prevent a cold epidemic.
In a network sense, even though both diseases are similar in terms of causal structure,
their links represent different causal probability values. The strict measures that are put in
place to prevent the spread of Ebola have the effect of lowering—if artificially—causal
probability values in the event network, which in turn decreases its effective connectivity.
The effects of causal probability on event probability, latency, and predictability
are straightforward: Greater causal probability increases event occurrence probability,
decreases its latency, and increases its predictability. It should be noted, however, that the
last point only applies for positive causal probability; when causal probability equals
zero, event non-occurrence is completely predictable. Simulation results that demonstrate
these effects are presented in §4.2.3, §4.3.3, and §4.4.2.3.
2.1.3. Centralization

10

In reality, the common cold is more contagious than Ebola, but the latter is more infectious.
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Some event precursors may be significantly more influential than others for at
least two possible reasons: first, because those precursors have a relatively large number
of links to other precursors, and second, because the links that emanate from those
precursors represent high causal probability values. The distribution of links as well as
the distribution of causal probability values thus matters. One illustration of this can be
found in politics: In an autocratic or oligarchic system, a small number of people hold
enormous power over virtually all aspects of policy-making. In a democratic system, on
the other hand, power tends to be distributed more broadly and more evenly. Let us
assume that the election of a certain high-level politician is a precursor to some focal
event. In an autocratic or oligarchic world, that precursor might occupy a central position
in the network since the election of that particular politician might influence a large
number of other precursors with high causal probability. In a democratic world, on the
other hand, it is less likely that such a precursor (or any precursor for that matter) would
occupy a central position in the network.
A causal structure that is characterized by high centralization should generally
make the focal event more probable and occur faster. This is because centralization
essentially shortens the path between the trigger point and the focal event. One thing to
note, however, is that link centralization is only structurally possible when link density is
not too high. (If all precursors are connected to each other, then each precursor is
endowed with the maximum number of links possible such that no precursor can be more
or less central than others.)
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As explained in detail later in §4.4.1.2 and §4.4.2.2, the relationship between
centralization and predictability is more nuanced, but in general, events with more
centralized causal structures tend to be less predictable. Event occurrence in a centralized
causal structure tends to be highly dependent on the activation of a small number of
“hub” precursors. There is thus a bottleneck that constricts the way in which precursor
activation reverberates through the causal structure. Centralization reduces the number of
alternative paths between precursors and the focal event, thereby lowering the level of
redundancy in the causal structure. This tends to produce a broader probability
distribution of latency, which makes prediction more difficult.
2.2. Forecasting mechanisms
Forecasting methods are classified into two categories: quantitative (sometimes
called objective) and judgmental (sometimes called subjective). The former generally
relies on statistical models and is usually employed when data are abundant. The latter
relies on the judgment of human forecasters and is usually employed when data are
scarce (Armstrong, 2001). Since one of the main goals of this paper is to understand the
ways in which forecasters take into account the causal structure of an event, my
discussion of forecasting mechanisms builds on the literature on judgmental rather than
quantitative methods. Human forecasters typically incorporate a more sophisticated
notion of causality in their predictive model than statistical models do, even if only
implicitly (cf. Axelrod, 1976).
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This paper assumes that forecasters’ predictive model about an event is directly
informed by their cognitive representation of the event’s causal structure. A forecaster’s
cognitive representation of an event’s causal structure may deviate from reality in several
ways, each of which becomes a source of forecast error:
At the most basic level, a forecaster may simply be ignorant of the causal
structure. In this case, the forecaster essentially lacks knowledge about precursors or
about the particular ways in which they are connected to each other. Going back to an
earlier example about traffic jam in downtown Chicago, a forecaster who is unfamiliar
with neighborhoods within the city may have difficulty predicting whether “broken
traffic lights at City Hall” is likely to be a direct cause of “accident on Michigan
Avenue.”
At another basic level, a forecaster may simply lack information about the event.
If a forecaster is asked today, in year 2014, to predict whether the New England Patriots
will win the Super Bowl in year 2024, the forecaster’s cognitive representation of this
event’s causal structure is very likely to deviate from reality, which will only be revealed
in 2024 (or shortly before then). Given the large temporal distance between years 2014
and 2024, there is simply not enough information that is available11 yet for any forecaster
to construct a reliable predictive model. In general, the sooner one has to make a
prediction, the less information there usually is.

11

Note that availability is not the same as accessibility. Availability of information in this paper correlates
perfectly to precursor activation. Whether a forecaster can get a hold of such information and process it is a
different story.
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Even when a forecaster has a good understanding of the causal structure of the
event and information availability is not a problem, the forecaster may still conjure up an
erroneous predictive model due to not paying full attention to available information. In
reality, human forecasters have limited attentional capacity (Kahneman, 1973) and can
effectively receive only a portion of all available information. Furthermore, while
processing information, people are motivated by a need for closure, i.e., a desire to
reduce ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), which can drive forecasters towards
quickly settling on certain pieces of information and treating the rest as irrelevant.
A forecaster who pays attention to only a subset of all available information may
do so arbitrarily or with some bias. There are at least two ways in which a forecaster may
be systematically selective in paying attention to information: First, forecasters differ in
terms of their tendency to think concretely versus abstractly (Costa & McRae, 1992). A
forecaster who thinks concretely tends to process information in a literal manner,
focusing on the details of the particular piece of information itself. A forecaster who
thinks abstractly, on the other hand, tends to treat information in a more contextual
manner. For example, in a scenario in which forecasters are asked to make predictions
about the financial market, a concrete thinker may treat new information about an Apple
product launch as strictly pertaining to Apple’s stock, whereas an abstract thinker may
see it as a broader signal about the technology sector.
Second, forecasters may differ in terms of their preference for older versus newer
information. Some forecasters may engage in cognitive conservatism and take into
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consideration only the earliest pieces of information that become available, ignoring any
information that comes later (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As Tetlock (2014) observes, “Once
forecasters form initial impressions of the causal propensities in play for a problem, these
impressions (activated schemata) will bias the interpretation of news in the direction of
dismissing disconfirming evidence and exaggerating the value of confirming evidence”
(p. 35). Other forecasters may adopt the exact opposite pattern; they engage in excessive
volatility by overweighting the value of new information and ignoring older pieces of
information (cf. Bondt & Thaler, 1985, Odean, 1998).
Overall, the discussions above suggest that there are at least five sources of
imperfect cognitive representation that could in turn result in forecast error: (1) ignorance
about causal structure, (2) lack of information availability, (3) arbitrary lack of attention,
(4) lack of attention due to big-picture bias, and (5) lack of attention due to temporal bias.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it is intended to guide the exploration of
some of the basic building blocks of cognitive imperfections in forecasting.12 I discuss in
the next section how these different types of cognitive imperfection interact with different
causal structures to influence forecast performance.
2.3. Forecaster performance in different causal structures
2.3.1. Comparison with the lens model

12

There is certainly a wealth of other sources of imperfect cognitive representations in the literature,
including biases due to social influence (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), social desirability (Zerbe and
Paulhus, 1987), and past experience (Denrell and March, 2001), among others. The exploration of these
topics would require an extension of the current model. As it is now, the model is designed to capture the
way in which a single forecaster makes a single prediction about a single event.
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This paper’s simultaneous analysis of forecasting environments and forecasting
mechanisms can be viewed as an extension of the lens model (Brunswik, 1955). The lens
model consists of three main components: an environment, a forecaster, and some cues
about the environment. In the model, the forecaster gets several cues about the
environment, evaluates the diagnosticity of those cues with regards to a particular event
in the environment, and subsequently utilizes the outcome of this evaluation to make a
prediction about the event. The cues’ true diagnosticity is only revealed after the event
materializes, and the closer to the truth the forecaster’s evaluation of cue diagnosticity is,
the more accurate the forecaster’s prediction is likely to be.
As explained in detail later in §3, the model in this paper consists of components
similar to those in the lens model: There is a forecasting environment and a forecaster’s
cognitive representation of it. The forecasting environment is modeled as a network of
causal relationships, similar to a Bayesian network, and the forecaster’s cognitive
representation as a faithful or semi-faithful replica of that network. Cues in this model are
information about the state of the network of causal relationships, i.e., which precursor
nodes have been activated, whether the focal event has occurred, and at what time. A
perfect forecaster receives this information without any loss of fidelity, similar to how the
perfect forecaster in the lens model has an assessment of cue diagnosticity that matches
the truth. It is worth noting here that one parallel between the two models is that the
perfect forecaster is the benchmark for performance, as opposed to, say, a random
forecaster or “dart-throwing chimp” (Tetlock, 2005).
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The model in this paper extends the lens model by unpacking the construct of cue
diagnosticity and proposing that it is embedded in a causal structure. In particular, as
elaborated later in §4 and §6, it shows how the structural features of an event influence
two distinct elements of cue diagnosticity: first, how predictive a set of cues is of event
occurrence, and second, how substitutable that set of cues is. The first is straightforward;
it simply refers to the probabilistic or correlative relationship between a set of cues and
event occurrence. The second is more interesting: It brings to light the idea of equifinality
in cue diagnosticity; event occurrence can result from multiple causal elements, some of
which are interchangeable.
The model in this paper also extends the lens model by demonstrating the various
ways in which a forecaster’s cognitive representation may systematically deviate from
the truth. These abstractions are intended not only to facilitate a theoretical discussion,
but also to provide a methodological illustration. One goal of the model in this regard is
that it offers researchers a new tool for formally speculating about the effects of cognitive
biases on forecast performance.
2.3.2. Interaction between forecasting environment and imperfect cognitive
representation
In order to develop some intuition about how each of the five types of imperfect
cognitive representation would fare in different forecasting environments, it is helpful to
briefly review how structural features influence event probability, latency, and
predictability (as previously discussed in §2.1): Greater number of precursors and greater
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network connectivity (both in terms of link density and causal probability) correspond to
greater probability, lower latency, and greater predictability. Greater centralization is
slightly different: While it corresponds to greater probability and lower latency, it
corresponds to lower predictability.
The matter of event predictability is especially important to keep in mind while
speculating about forecast performance. In an unpredictable forecasting environment,
performance tends to be dictated by chance as much as by the notion of skill (which in
this paper corresponds to a cognitive representation that matches the truth). As Denrell
and Liu (2012) demonstrate in their model, the presence of noise and self-reinforcing
dynamics can result in extreme performance that to a large extent is due to luck.
I discuss below how forecast performance is likely to be affected by the
characteristics of the forecasting environment for each type of imperfect cognitive
representation. Forecast performance is measured as the ability to predict latency (rather
than event occurrence as a binary variable). Forecast error is thus measured in terms of
the discrepancy between actual and predicted latencies.
2.3.2.1. Imperfect understanding of structural relationships between event
precursors
Structural ignorance tends to hurt forecast performance the most in an event that
is highly structured. The assumption here is that when forecasters know little about the
causal relationships between precursors, they are likely to believe that the event’s causal
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structure is more random than it actually is. In other words, randomness is the presumed
baseline for an uninformed forecaster. Given this assumption, centralization is the one
parameter of an event’s causal structure that is likely to matter the most in influencing the
effect of structural ignorance on forecast performance. Presented with an event that is
characterized by a highly centralized causal structure, a structurally ignorant forecaster
who sees it as random becomes incredibly prone to making egregious errors in estimating
the sequential impacts of precursor activation.
This assumption that an ignorant forecaster regresses towards a random outlook
certainly does not always hold, but it is meant to be more illustrative than dogmatic.
Given a different assumption, the key idea endures: The grossest errors come from the
biggest discrepancies between an event’s true causal structure and a forecaster’s
cognitive representation of it.
The effect of structural ignorance on forecast performance is likely to be
dampened by factors that introduce redundancy into the causal structure. For instance,
link density corresponds to the number of alternative paths between precursors. High link
density could thus neutralize the effects of structural ignorance; in a causal structure with
high link density, there tends to be many ways to reach precursor Y from precursor X
such that misplacing several links between them is likely to be innocuous.
Looking back at some of the examples discussed in §2.1, a structurally ignorant
forecaster would be expected to perform poorly when making predictions about an event
that takes place in an autocratic or oligarchic political system, in which the distribution of
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causal relationships tends to be uneven. The introduction of mechanisms that add new
causal relationships into the relevant causal structure, such as a new communication
technology, however, could lessen the impact of structural ignorance on forecast
performance.
2.3.2.2. Lack of available information
Lack of available information generally has the most adverse effect on forecast
performance in highly unpredictable forecasting environments. In such environments, the
ability to reduce uncertainty, including through new information, is valued at a premium.
Furthermore, on the assumption that lack of available information is a function of
temporal distance, forecast performance is likely to be affected the most in events that
unfold quickly. In such events, information gets updated substantially in a short period of
time such that the inability to wait a little may incur a large penalty.
Lack of information due to temporal distance is thus expected to hurt forecast
performance the most when the forecasting environment is characterized by structural
features that correspond to low event latency and low predictability. High link density,
high causal probability, and high centralization are all expected to correspond to
accelerated precursor activation throughout the causal structure, which reduces latency.
And as previously discussed, low link density, low causal probability, and high
centralization all correspond to greater unpredictability. Of these structural parameters,
centralization thus unambiguously worsens the effect of lack of information on forecast
performance. Link density and causal probability, on the other hand, present a trade-off:
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While they correspond to low event latency, they have a positive relationship with event
predictability. Between latency and overall predictability, however, latency is the more
dominant factor because the speed at which information unfolds cancels out ex-ante
unpredictability. Overall, lack of information due to temporal distance thus tends to hurt
forecast performance the most in causal structures that are characterized by high link
density and high causal probability, particularly when they are highly centralized.
2.3.2.3. Arbitrary lack of attention to available information
An arbitrary lack of attention tends to lead forecasters to believe that event
occurrence is going to occur at a later time. This is because when forecasters miss
information about precursor activation, they tend to underestimate the extent to which it
has reverberated through the event’s causal structure.
Nevertheless, when a forecaster’s arbitrary lack of attention to available
information is proportional to the amount of information available, causal structure is
unlikely to influence the relationship between attention and forecast performance. The
magnitude of underestimation of extent of precursor activation in particular structure is
likely to be proportional to the probability and latency of event occurrence in that
structure, such that differences in forecast error across structures tend to cancel out.
It is interesting to note, however, that controlling for time, information availability
tends to be greater in a causal structure with greater link density. As such, forecasters in a
densely connected causal structure who want to achieve a similar level of performance to
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forecasters in a sparsely connected causal structure would have to pay attention to a
larger absolute amount of information.
2.3.2.4. Big-picture bias in attention
Big-picture bias tends to hurt forecast performance the most when the occurrence
of the event in question depends on specific precursors (i.e., those with low
substitutability). Such an event is typically path dependent; the particular sequence of
precursor activation matters.
There are at least two ways in which causal structure corresponds to path
dependency. First, a structure that is characterized by low link density should be more
path-dependent than one that is characterized by high link density. Link density endows a
network structure with redundancy, which is inversely correlated with path dependency.
Second, a random structure should be more path-dependent than a highly centralized one.
Centralization tends to introduce symmetry, which reduces path dependency in the causal
structure.
The effect of big-picture bias is also likely to more pronounced when there is
some but not too much information available in the environment. In the beginning, when
information is scarce, and later on, when information is abundant, there is not much room
available for differing interpretations. In the beginning, there is not much to be
interpreted, and later on, there is not enough uncertainty to allow divergent views to
flourish.
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The effect of big-picture bias in different types of events also depends on the
extent to which the forecaster takes into account the level of structural similarity between
precursors. Structural similarity here refers to similarity in causal relationships. For
example, if both precursors X and Y are causally connected to precursors A and B, then
precursors X and Y are structurally similar to each other.
A big-picture forecaster who treats all information indiscriminately is—
unsurprisingly—going to fare the worst given an event in which precursors bear little
structural similarity to each other in general. An example of such a structure is one that is
characterized by low link density and low centralization. In general, link density creates
redundancy, and centralization creates symmetry, both of which increase the overall
structural similarity between precursors in the network.
The effect of big-picture bias on forecast performance is more interesting to
consider when the forecaster is mindful of the level of structural similarity between
precursors. On the one hand, given an event in which precursors bear little structural
similarity to each other, such a forecaster is unlikely to overgeneralize when interpreting
information. On the other hand, given an event in which precursors tend to be structurally
similar to each other, such a forecaster is likely to make generalizations, but those
generalizations also tend to be well justified. In either case, the effect of big-picture bias
on forecast performance essentially becomes muted.
2.3.2.5. Temporal bias in attention
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The effect of temporal bias on forecast performance depends on how different
newer and older pieces of information are from each other in relation to the focal event.
Newer and older information here simply refers to precursor activation—newer
information pertains to precursors that are activated later, whereas older information
pertains to precursors that are activated early on. The greater the differences are between
those precursors, the greater the likelihood that a preference for newer information would
result in superior forecast performance. This is because newer information is generally
more diagnostic of event occurrence than older information is. After all, if old
information were diagnostic of event occurrence, the event would have occurred when
the information was still new.
There are several structural features that could influence how different newer and
older pieces of information are from each other. Greater link density and greater
centralization both correspond to shorter path length, which tends to reduce the difference
between precursors that are activated early and those that are activated late. Greater link
density also corresponds to greater redundancy, which again tends to reduce the
difference between early and late precursors. Considering these structural features alone,
the forecast performance differential between forecasters who prefer newer information
and those who prefer older information is likely to be the largest given causal structures
that are sparse and random.
Causal probability has a paradoxical effect: On the one hand, everything else
equal, low causal probability increases the temporal distance between early and late
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precursors. On the other hand, low causal probability means that the extent of overall
precursor activation tends to be low such that there is not much information available to
the forecaster. In this case, the forecaster who prefers newer information and the
forecaster who prefers older information are likely to end up considering very similar
(i.e., substantially overlapping) subsets of information, which nullifies their forecast
performance differentials. Considering these opposing effects, there is thus an optimal
causal probability value at which the performance differential is the largest between
forecasters who prefer newer information and those who prefer older information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In §3, I provide a detailed
description of the model in this paper. In §4, I discuss simulation results that demonstrate
the effects of structural parameters on event probability, latency, and predictability. In §5,
I discuss four types of structurally distinct events, which arise from the combinations of
extreme structural parameter values. In §6, I discuss simulation results that demonstrate
the effects of imperfect cognitive representations on forecast performance in the four
types of structurally distinct events. In §7, I discuss how the simulation results translate
into practical takeaways for real-world forecasters. In §8, I discuss some limitations and
possible extensions of the model. And finally, in §9, I present a brief conclusion. Table 1
summarizes how some of the terminologies that have been discussed up to this point
correspond to terminologies used in the computational model.
----- Insert Table 1 about here -----
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3. Model specifications
The model consists of two main components. The first component is a network
model of an event’s causal structure, which I refer to as the event structure network. The
second component is a network model of a forecaster’s cognitive representation of the
event’s causal structure, which I refer to as the cognitive representation network. I refer
to the “forecaster” in the model as the forecasting agent to distinguish it from a real-life
human forecaster.
3.1. Event structure network and event occurrence
3.1.1. Event structure network
The event structure network is described by three structural parameters: network
size (N), link density parameter (D), and centrality parameter (C). There is also a fourth,
non-structural parameter, causal probability (pc), which I discuss in §3.1.2 below.
N is simply the number of precursor nodes in the network. D refers to link density,
expressed as a percentage of the maximum number of links that a network of size N could
have. In other words, when D = 1, the network is fully connected. And so for example,
when N = 10, the number of links in the fully connected version of the network is 45 such
that a network that is characterized by N = 10 and D = 0.2 has 9 links.13

13

Number of links = 𝐷 𝑁  (𝑁 − 1) 2 and the model is specified such that if this number is not an integer, it
is rounded down.
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C describes the way in which links are distributed in the network during its
generation process. Specifically, it tunes the probability that a precursor node receives a
new link based on that precursor node’s existing number of links. This probability is
expressed as:

𝑝! =

𝑒

!
! ! !
!!! !!
!
!!! 𝑝!!

[1]

where	
  pi is the probability that precursor node i is selected to receive a new link and ki is
precursor node i’s existing number of links. The larger C is, the more likely it is for a
precursor node with a large number of existing links to receive new links relative to other
precursor nodes with fewer existing links. As such, a large C indicates a strong rich-getricher mechanism. Conversely, when C is zero, links are distributed at random across all
precursor nodes. When the number of links in the network equals N	
  - 1 and C is very
large, the network takes the shape of a perfect star with a single hub.
3.1.2. Event occurrence
The process that leads to the occurrence of an event is represented in terms of
signal propagation from a trigger point node (i.e., a precursor node that is the first to get
activated) to a focal event node in the event structure network.14 Both the trigger point
and the focal event nodes are chosen at random, and they are never identical. Each
precursor node in the network can have one of two states at a given period, inactivated
14

Links in this network are initially bidirectional, but as implied in this section, a signal can only travel via
a link once, so in actuality each link becomes unidirectional as soon as a signal travels through it.
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and activated. For simplicity, a precursor node can go from an inactivated state to an
activated state, but not the other way around. In other words, once a precursor node is on,
it stays on. An event is said to occur when the focal event node gets activated, and the
amount of time that passes up to focal event node activation is referred to as latency (T).
For the purpose of data analysis, event occurrence is reported as “1” whereas nonoccurrence is reported as “0.” Both latency and event occurrence values are generally
obtained by taking the average of 1000 repetitions.15
At t	
  = 0, all precursor nodes are inactivated, except for one randomly chosen
trigger point node. Each link is endowed with a causal probability pc, which describes the
probability that an activated precursor node i	
  at t leads to the activation of precursor node
j at (t	
  + 1) via link ij. Except at t	
  = 0, multiple precursor nodes can get activated at once at
a given period. For simplicity, causal probability pc is identical for all links in the
network.16
When link density is sufficiently high, trigger point and focal event nodes are
likely to reside in the same connected component. When this is the case, the event is
bound to occur as long as t is allowed to approach infinity and pc > 0. Conversely, when
link density is sufficiently low, trigger point and focal event nodes may reside in different
connected components such that the event will never occur.
15

These values are difficult to solve for analytically. It is more practical to obtain them through repeated
sampling.
16
Varying pc across links is a difficult task because it requires a probability distribution (from which to
draw pc) that satisfies both of the following conditions: (1) it is defined on the interval [0,1], and (2) it
allows for the variation of mean while holding the general shape of the distribution constant, e.g., in terms
of skewness. The beta distribution satisfies the first condition but unfortunately fails the second.
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3.2. Cognitive representation network
At baseline, the forecasting agent’s cognitive representation network is set to be
identical to the event structure network, including the structural positions of the
designated trigger point and focal event nodes. Some modifications may then be
introduced to it to reflect the forecasting agent’s particular type of imperfect cognitive
representation (as discussed in §3.2.1 below).
On this cognitive representation network, the forecasting agent runs its own signal
propagation simulation much like how such a simulation is carried out on the event
structure network, in which each inactivated neighbor of each activated precursor node is
at risk of getting activated according to causal probability pc. The forecasting agent uses
the result of this simulation to offer a binary prediction about whether the event will
occur and at what time: If the focal event node in the cognitive representation network
gets activated at some point, the forecasting agent offers a positive prediction (“1”) of
event occurrence and also reports the forecasted latency (T’). Conversely, if the focal
event node never gets activated, the forecasting agent offers a null prediction (“0”) of
event occurrence. As with the event network, both forecasted latency and prediction of
event occurrence values are generally obtained by taking the average of 1000 repetitions.
It should be noted that the forecasting agent’s cognitive representation simulation can
start at t > 0, in which case the forecasting agent would begin its simulation equipped
with some information about which precursor nodes are already activated in the event
structure network. (This is explained in more detail in §3.2.2.)
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Below, I discuss how each of the five sources of cognitive imperfection is
operationalized in the model. The first of the five is primarily about links in the network,
whereas the other four are primarily about precursor nodes.
3.2.1. Imperfect understanding of structural relationships between event precursors
A forecasting agent may have an imperfect understanding of the structural
relationships between event precursors, which translates into a faulty cognitive
representation network. To depict this, I assign a rewiring parameter w, which describes
the probability that a link in the forecasting agent’s cognitive representation network gets
randomly reassigned. This rewiring parameter w ranges from 0 to 1. When w = 1, every
link in the cognitive representation network gets randomly reassigned, and when w = 0,
the cognitive representation network is identical to the event structure network (Figure 7).
It should be noted here that a forecasting agent’s perception of link density is assumed to
be accurate.
----- Insert Figure 7 about here ----3.2.2. Lack of available information (due to forecast time)
Given the model setup, the number of precursor nodes that are in activated state
tends to increase with time. (At the very least, it stays the same.) Correspondingly,
information about which and how many precursor nodes have been activated is
increasingly available over time. A forecasting agent that has to make a prediction at
forecast time tf	
  = t	
  = 0 thus has less information available than a forecasting agent that
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can wait until tf	
  = t	
  > 0 to make a prediction. Based on this feature, I vary tf to examine
the effect of information availability on forecast accuracy. The value of tf ranges from 0
to ∞.
When a forecasting agent has to make a prediction based on information that is
available at tf	
  = t, it does so first by activating all the precursor nodes in its cognitive
representation network whose corresponding precursor nodes have been activated in the
event structure network by t. With those activated precursor nodes as the initial
condition, the forecasting agent then runs a signal propagation simulation on its cognitive
representation network and subsequently reports the forecasted presence/absence of event
occurrence and the corresponding forecasted latency (T’).
The option of manipulating information availability directly (without using
forecast time as a proxy) is readily available as a modeling tool. In real-world events,
however, it is difficult to know the extent to which event precursors have been activated.
In contrast, temporal markers (and by extension, how much time has passed) can be
easily identified, even if t = 0 may be difficult to define.
3.2.3. Arbitrary lack of attention to available information
To take into account the possibility that a forecasting agent misses some
information updates, I assign an attention parameter a, which describes the probability
that the forecasting agent pays attention to new information about event structure
precursor node activation. This attention parameter a ranges from 0 to 1. For example, if
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by some tf	
   = t > 0, there are 10 activated precursor nodes in the event structure, the
forecasting agent with a = 0.6 is likely to incorrectly “believe” that approximately 4 out
of those 10 activated precursor nodes are still inactivated. Consequently, at tf, the
forecasting agent would only activate approximately 6 precursor nodes in the cognitive
representation network that correspond to the 6 precursor nodes it “believes” to have
been activated in the event structure network. Note that since information about activated
precursor nodes in the event structure network (aside from information about the trigger
point node) is only available when t > 0, this attention parameter a is only relevant when
tf = t > 0.
3.2.4. Big-picture bias in attention
A forecasting agent with an inclination towards big-picture thinking is one that is
likely to treat specific information as diffuse. Provided with information that is
specifically about precursor node i, the forecasting agent is likely to instead treat it as
general information about precursor nodes that are structurally similar to i.
To simplify the modeling task, such a big-picture forecasting agent is
operationalized as likely to confuse two or more structurally similar precursor nodes.
“Confusion” here means that information about one precursor node may be mistaken for
that about another precursor node. For example, if precursor node i in the event structure
network gets activated, the forecasting agent may perceive that precursor node j as the
one that gets activated instead, provided that precursor nodes i and j are structurally
similar enough. Since the simulation is repeated many times, this operationalization
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sufficiently approximates the forecasting agent’s representation of specific information as
diffuse.
Structural similarity here is measured using Jaccard index (Jaccard, 1901), which
takes into account the co-occurrence (and ignores the co-absence) of ties between two
precursor nodes. In the model, a forecasting agent is endowed with a similarity threshold
s, which sets the minimum Jaccard index between two precursor nodes that has to be met
for the forecasting agent to confuse those two precursor nodes. This similarity threshold s
ranges from 0 to 1. When s = 0, the forecasting agent confuses the entire network, and
when s = 1, it is very unlikely to confuse two precursor nodes for one another.17 Similar
to the attention parameter a, the similarity threshold s is only relevant when tf = t > 0.
3.2.5. Temporal bias in attention
A forecasting agent’s preference for newer vs. older information is captured by
the parameter temporal bias b, which ranges from -∞ to ∞. When b < 0, the forecasting
agent prefers older information; when b > 0, the forecasting agent prefers newer
information; and when b = 0, the forecasting agent has no temporal bias.
When b < 0, the probability that an information update about precursor node i is
taken into account by the forecasting agent is described by:

17

When s = 1, the only scenario in which a forecasting agent may confuse precursor nodes for one another
is when there is a perfect star structure in the network. In such a structure, all pairs of peripheral precursor
nodes have a Jaccard index of 1. A perfect star structure is likely to be found at low D and high C.
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𝑝!! = 𝑒

!! !!! !! !

[2a]

and when b > 0, the probability that an information update about precursor node i is taken
into account by the forecasting agent is described by:
𝑝!! = 𝑒 !!! !

[2b]

where na is the number of event structure precursor nodes that have been activated, and ri
is precursor node i’s rank among all activated precursor nodes in terms of “age,” whereby
a smaller value corresponds to a more recent activation. A precursor node i’s rank ri can
range from 0 to na. Note that when b = 0, 𝑝!! = 1.
The modeling choice of having 𝑝!!   dependent on precursor node i’s “age rank” as
opposed to its “age” assumes that all forecasting agents have some attention capacity
limitation, which forces them to prioritize information based on relative recency.
Accordingly, two forecasting agents with temporal biases of equal magnitudes but
opposing signs will likely take into account similar amounts of information (though of
differing “ages”).
Consider the alternative: If 𝑝!!   were dependent on “age” per se, in situations in
which all or most available information happens to be new, the forecasting agent with
positive temporal bias would end up taking into account a large amount of information,
whereas the forecasting agent with negative temporal bias would end up taking into
account a small amount of information. In this setup, forecasting agents with temporal
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bias values of equal magnitudes and opposing signs are not symmetrical opposites since
the volumes of information that they take into consideration are not matched.
4. Understanding events
The simulation results in this paper are discussed in three parts: This section (§4)
is dedicated towards understanding how network attributes of the causal structure shape
events, and how they ultimately shape the probability, latency, and predictability of event
occurrence. In §5, I build upon this understanding and look at four classes of structurally
distinct events, which represent the archetypal forecasting environments in which real
world forecasters may operate. Finally, §6 is dedicated towards understanding how a
forecaster’s imperfect cognitive representation of an event’s causal structure influences
forecast performance. In particular, I look at how the effect of cognitive representation
varies from one class of event to another in order to understand how and when a
particular type of imperfect cognitive representation is more or less costly for forecast
performance. Table 2 lists all independent and dependent variables studied in this paper.
And much like the discussion in §2.1, Table 3 previews the key results discussed in this
section.
----- Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here ----4.1. Network centralization (Cx)
As discussed in §2.1.3, the extent of centralization in the event structure network
is a key feature of the model. It is thus important to first understand how centralization is
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influenced by event structure network parameters. As described in §3.1.1 and §3.1.2,
there are four such parameters: network size (N), link density parameter (D), centrality
parameter (C), and causal probability (pc).
To measure the extent of centralization in the event structure network, I use
Freeman’s (1979) measure of network centralization (Cx):

𝐶! =

!
!!! 𝐶! 𝑝∗ −
𝑚𝑎𝑥 !
!!! 𝐶! 𝑝∗

𝐶! 𝑝!
  
− 𝐶! 𝑝!

[3]

where 𝐶! 𝑝! is the degree centrality of precursor node i	
  and 𝐶! 𝑝∗ is the degree
centrality of the precursor node with the highest degree centrality in the network;
!
!!! 𝐶!

𝑚𝑎𝑥

𝑝∗ − 𝐶! 𝑝! is the sum of all degree centrality differences in a network, and

!
!!! 𝐶!

𝑝∗ − 𝐶! 𝑝! is the theoretically largest such sum of differences in a

network of the same size (i.e., a perfect star network of size N).
Of the four event structure parameters, causal probability has no influence on
network centralization since it is not a structural parameter. Network size is also unlikely
to affect network centralization directly. Rather, the mechanism of its effect on network
centralization, if there is any, likely involves link density, which suggests that it could be
understood by varying the link density parameter instead of network size. For this reason,
I keep network size constant throughout all simulations. Based on preliminary
simulations, I choose N = 50, which is large enough to produce robust results but not so
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large as to be computationally overwhelming. I discuss below the remaining two event
structure parameters: link density parameter and centrality parameter.
4.1.1. Effect of link density parameter (D) on Cx
Figure 8 summarizes the relationship between link density parameter and network
centralization. The first thing to note in this figure is that link density parameter is
dominant to centrality parameter. When link density parameter has a value of 0 or close
to 1, network centralization is 0 or close to 0 regardless of centrality parameter. This
points out that in unconnected or very densely connected causal structures, no single
event precursor is likely to be more centrally influential than others.
The second thing to note is that as shown in Figure 8A, link density parameter has
some effect on network centralization, independent of centrality parameter. When links
are distributed randomly across event precursors, a moderately connected network is
more centralized than very sparsely connected or very densely connected networks.
Nevertheless, network centralization in a random network has a relatively low upper
limit, as it should. Figures 8D and 8E show, however, that when link distribution is
guided by a strong rich-get-richer mechanism—as indicated by the high centrality
parameter values—the highest level of network centralization is observed in very
sparsely connected (but not empty) networks. This is because such sparsely connected
networks contain the number of links close to the exact number of links that are needed to
generate a perfect star network. For example, when N = 50, the number of links in a
perfect star network is 49, which corresponds to a link density parameter value of 0.04.
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----- Insert Figure 8 about here ----4.1.2. Effect of centrality parameter (C) on Cx
Figure 9 summarizes the relationship between centrality parameter and network
centralization in relatively sparsely connected networks. (Recall from §4.1.1 above that
the effect of centrality parameter on network centralization is suppressed when link
density is high.) The S-shape is consistent with the shape of an 𝑒 ! curve that is capped at
1; it corresponds to equation [1], according to which the probability that a precursor node
becomes more central than other precursor nodes grows exponentially with centrality
parameter. Thus, in sparsely connected networks, there is a critical centrality parameter
value at which network centralization suddenly shifts from low to high. This is an
interesting observation: It suggests that networks with moderate network centralization
are rare; they instead tend to be either highly centralized or close to random.
----- Insert Figure 9 about here ----4.2. Probability of event occurrence (pe)
The probability of event occurrence (pe) is another fundamental dependent
variable to understand in the model. There are two aspects of pe to take into account: first,
maximum pe, i.e., what pe is as t approaches infinity; and second, the slope of pe	
  when
plotted against t, i.e., how fast pe changes with time. Maximum pe in this case simply
corresponds to the probability that both trigger point and focal event nodes reside in the
same connected component (“island”) in the network. The value of pe is obtained by
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averaging event occurrences and non-occurrences (1s and 0s) from 1000 repetitions. For
example, if by t = 15, the event has occurred in 600 out of 1000 repetitions, then pe at t
=15 is 0.6.
Of the four event structure network parameters, I again designate network size N
constant (and set it at N	
  = 50) as its influence on pe depends on the other three
parameters: link density parameter (D), centrality parameter (C), and causal probability
(pc). I discuss the effects of these three parameters below:
4.2.1. Effect of link density parameter (D) on probability of event occurrence (pe)
An increase in link density has two distinct structural effects: first, it lowers the
path length between trigger point and focal event nodes, and second, it increases the
number of alternative paths between trigger point and focal event nodes, thereby
increasing redundancy in the network. Consequently, greater link density reduces the
likelihood that trigger point and focal event nodes reside in separate “islands”, and it also
reduces the time it takes for an event to occur. The expected relationship between link
density and probability of event occurrence is thus straightforward: it should be positive.
Figure 10 provides evidence that this is indeed the case.
Figure 10A shows that maximum pe increases with D. At D = 0.08, maximum pe
approaches 1, which means that by the time D reaches 0.08, there is already a very high
probability that the trigger point and focal event nodes reside in the same connected
component. Figure 10B plots D against the fraction of precursor nodes that belong to the
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largest connected component in a random network. It points out that only a relatively low
link density is needed for a large fraction of precursor nodes in a random network to
belong to the largest connected component. For instance, when D = 0.04, almost 80% of
all precursor nodes reside in the largest connected component.
Figure 10C summarizes the relationship between D and pe as the latter is plotted
against time. As would be expected, the slope of pe gets steeper as D becomes larger. The
steepest portion of each curve appears to correspond to the average latency (T): As
Figures 10C and 10D show, the steepest portion of the curve for D = 1 occurs around t =
30, which corresponds to the average T of 29.4. The interpretation is straightforward: It
simply suggests that event occurrence is most likely to take place at 𝑡 ≈ 𝑇.
----- Insert Figure 10 about here ----4.2.2. Effect of centrality on probability of event occurrence (pe)
Figure 11 shows that greater centrality parameter corresponds to a greater
probability of event occurrence and that this relationship takes an S-shape. Here, it is
useful to recall Figure 9, which shows that the centrality parameter and network
centralization also have an S-shape relationship. Taken together, Figures 9 and 11 imply
that network centralization has a positive linear effect on the probability of event
occurrence. Figure 12 shows that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, it appears that
what drives these results is the relationship between network centralization and average
path length; the more centralized a network is, the lower the average path length in that
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network, and this facilitates faster signal propagation from the trigger point node to the
focal event node. Figure 13 depicts an inverse linear relationship between network
centralization and average path length (excluding isolates). Taken together, these results
suggest that all things being equal, the probability of event occurrence is higher when
there are event precursors that occupy central positions.
Prior studies (e.g., Cohen, 2000) have demonstrated that scale-free networks,
which are generated through a rich-get-richer mechanism (similar to the one used to
generate centralized networks in this paper), are relatively robust to random attacks.
Removal of one or more nodes at random is less likely to result in structural
disintegration when the network is scale-free rather than random. In a similar spirit, I run
simulations to see whether more centralized networks in this model are “hurt” less by
random removal of precursor nodes.18 Interestingly, it appears that they are not. Random
removal of precursor nodes appears to affect centralized networks more negatively in
terms of latency (T), though not in terms of maximum pe. Following random removal of
precursor nodes, random networks (D = 0.1, C = 0, pc = 0.2) see an average 5.47%
increase in T, whereas centralized networks (D = 0.1, C = 20, pc = 0.2) see an average
9.64% increase in T. The difference between these increases in T is statistically
significant at p = 0.06. Decreases in maximum pe are similar in relative magnitude for
both random and centralized networks, at 18.8% and 19.7%, respectively. The difference
between these decreases is not statistically significant (p > 0.1).

18

In this instance, I remove 10% of precursor nodes from a network of size 50.
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Overall, the model suggests that events are more likely to occur in more
centralized event structures, but those event structures are also more sensitive to random
removal of event precursors.
----- Insert Figures 11, 12, and 13 about here ----4.2.3. Effect of causal probability (pc) on pe
The relationship between causal probability and the probability of event
occurrence is straightforward. As Figure 14 shows, greater causal probability corresponds
to a steeper slope when pe is plotted against t. Causal probability, however, has no effect
on maximum pe since it has no effect on the structure of the network (i.e., it does not
influence the probability that trigger point and focal event nodes reside in the same
connected component).
----- Insert Figure 14 about here ----4.3. Latency (T)
4.3.1. Effect of link density parameter (D) on T	
  	
  
As Figure 15A shows, greater link density parameter corresponds to smaller T,
and the relationship is exponential. This exponential shape corresponds to the inverse
exponential relationship between link density parameter and average path length (Figure
15B). Average path length has a direct effect on T in that it simply corresponds to the
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probable distance between trigger point and focal event nodes (and therefore the time that
it takes for a signal to travel between those two nodes).
----- Insert Figure 15 about here ----4.3.2. Effect of centrality parameter (C) on T
As Figure 16 shows, greater centrality parameter and (by extension) greater
network centralization correspond to smaller T. These results are consistent with the
results discussed in §4.2.2: Greater centrality or centralization corresponds to lower
average path length (Figure 13), which allows signal propagation from the trigger point
node to the focal event node to occur faster.
----- Insert Figure 16 about here ----4.3.3. Effect of causal probability (pc) on T	
  
As Figure 17 shows, an increase in causal probability corresponds to an
exponential decrease in T. Greater causal probability on average increases the number of
precursor nodes that get activated at a given period, and those additional “on” precursor
nodes in turn activate more of their neighbors in subsequent periods, hence the
exponential effect.
----- Insert Figure 17 about here -----
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4.4. Predictability: Sensitivity to random perturbations
In order to correctly interpret results on forecast performance, it is important to
first understand how sensitive the corresponding event is to random perturbations. Given
an inherently fickle event, inferior performance may not be the forecaster’s fault and
superior forecasting performance may be due to luck. Such events are simply less
predictable.
There are at least two sources of random perturbations to which an event may be
sensitive: the first is the network generation process that gives rise to the causal structure,
and the second is the signal propagation process. The significance of understanding the
former is that in real-world forecasting, it is generally (much) easier to guess the levels of
link density and centrality of an event’s causal structure than to figure out the exact
causal structure itself. Understanding the extent to which structures could vary for given a
combination of link density and centrality is thus useful for estimating the difficulty of a
forecasting task. The larger the extent, the wider the range of possibilities, and the more
difficult it is to produce an accurate forecast. (It should be noted here that “difficulty” in
this discussion is not a matter of skill but rather of intrinsic randomness.) With regards to
random perturbations in signal propagation, the point of understanding it is both
theoretical and practical. In the theoretical sense, it underscores the notion that even if the
exact event structure is knowable, the way in which an event unfolds within it can still be
very difficult to predict. In the practical sense, it shows that having a good guess about
only the levels of link density and centrality (as opposed to the exact event structure) is
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enough to estimate how sensitive a corresponding event is to signal propagation
stochasticity, which again offers an idea about the level of forecasting difficulty.
4.4.1. Structural variation
Due to the probabilistic element in the way in which links are distributed among
precursor nodes in the network generation process, a given combination of D and C can
give rise to a large number of unique network structures. Variations in unique network
structures are likely to translate into variations in pe and T,	
  which in turn indicate how
predictable event occurrence is for a given pair of D and C.
Between pe and T, T is the more sensitive measure as the same pe can correspond
to multiple Ts. Based on this understanding, I measure event predictability due to
structural variation as follows: First, I generate 50 unique network structures for a given
parameter set (i.e., combination of D, C, and pc).19 On each unique network structure, I
then run 100 simulations with identical trigger point and focal event nodes. The number
of repetitions for each parameter set in total is thus 50 x 100 = 5,000. From 100
simulations per unique network structure, I obtain an average T, and subsequently, for
each parameter set, I look at the coefficient of variation of those average T’s across
unique network structures, abbreviated as cvT	
  structural. I then compare cvT	
  structural	
  
against specific network parameters (D, C, and pc):

19

Fifty is admittedly a small number relative to the total number of possible unique structures, but
considering that there are 100 simulations per unique structure, it would unfortunately be time-prohibitive
to run a larger sample.
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4.4.1.1. Effect of link density parameter (D) on cvT	
  structural	
  
As Figure 18 shows, greater link density corresponds to smaller cvT	
  structural.
This observation makes sense: As long as D > 0, the number of possible unique structures
decreases as more links are added into the network; ultimately, that number reaches one
as no additional link can be added and the network is fully connected. Densely connected
networks are thus more likely than sparsely connected networks to be similar to each
other. If pc = 1 such that the only source of random perturbations in the event’s causal
structure is the network generation process, events that arise from densely connected
networks should on average be more inherently predictable than those that arise from
sparsely connected networks.
----- Insert Figure 18 about here ----4.4.1.2. Effect of centrality on cvT	
  structural	
  
As Figure 19 shows, greater centrality corresponds to smaller cvT	
  structural.
Greater centrality means that links are distributed less randomly. The parameter C drives
link distribution towards a star configuration, thereby biasing the network generation
process towards producing isomorphic structures. Figure 19 also shows that the effect of
centrality on	
  cvT	
  structural becomes weaker as link density increases. This observation is
consistent with that in §4.4.1.1 above; at high link density, the number of possible unique
network structures is low regardless of centralization. Taken together, these results thus
suggest that if pc = 1 such that the only source of random perturbations in the event’s
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causal structure is the network generation process, events that arise from centralized
networks should be more inherently predictable than those that arise from random
networks, except when link density is high, in which case centralization makes little or no
difference.
----- Insert Figure 19 about here ----4.4.1.3. Effect of causal probability (pc) on cvT	
  structural	
  
Figure 20 shows that causal probability has little or no effect on cvT	
  structural at
various levels of link density and centrality. Causal probability is indeed not a structural
parameter, so this is not a surprising observation.
----- Insert Figure 20 about here ----4.4.2. Stochasticity in signal propagation
Another source of random perturbations in the event’s causal structure is
stochasticity in the signal propagation process. As such, two simulations run on identical
network structures are likely to produce different values of T. Moreover, different
network structures are likely to be more or less sensitive to this element of randomness.
To measure event predictability due to signal propagation stochasticity, I follow a
method similar to the one described in §4.4.1 above and call the resulting measure cvT
propagation. There is one key difference between cvT structural and cvT propagation:
Whereas the former quantifies variation across unique network structures, the latter
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quantifies variation within each unique network structure. To obtain cvT propagation, I
first measure cvT from each set of 100 simulations per unique network structure, then take
the average cvT from 50 unique network structures in each parameter set.
4.4.2.1. Effect of link density parameter (D) on cvT	
  propagation
As Figure 21 shows, link density seems to have little or no effect on cvT	
  
propagation. To interpret this observation correctly, it is important to understand how
link density affects several possible drivers of cvT	
  propagation. Considering that T
depends on the signal propagation path between trigger point and focal event nodes, there
are at least three such drivers: average path length, number of alternative paths, and
coefficient of variation of path length (cvPL)—all between trigger point and focal event
nodes. The first two are self-explanatory, and the last of the three describes the extent to
which the distance between trigger point and focal event nodes is likely to vary given a
set of network parameters. Two network structures may be characterized by identical
average path lengths between trigger point and focal event nodes and yet different cvPL.
----- Insert Figure 21 about here ----As previously shown in Figure 15B, greater link density simply corresponds to a
smaller average path length. The relationship between link density and number
alternative paths is also straightforward: Greater link density equals more links, and more
links translates into a greater number of alternative paths. Finally, both lower average
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path length and greater number of alternative paths should lead to smaller cvPL. Figure 22
confirms that this is indeed the case: Greater link density corresponds to smaller cvPL.
----- Insert Figure 22 about here ----To investigate the relationship between average path length and cvT	
  propagation
while isolating away other structural effects, I create a simple linear chain (Figure 23A),
vary the chain length, and measure cvT	
  propagation based on the time it takes for a
signal to propagate from one end to the other. The result is shown in Figure 23B: Greater
path length corresponds to smaller cvT	
  propagation. Similarly, to investigate the
relationship between number of alternative paths and cvT	
  propagation, I create a simple
network (Figure 24A), vary the number of parallel intermediate precursor nodes, and
again measure cvT	
  propagation based on the time it takes for a signal to propagate from
one end to the other. The result is shown in Figure 24B: Greater number of alternative
paths corresponds to smaller cvT	
  propagation. Finally, I probe the effect of cvPL on cvT	
  
propagation directly on the event structure network. The results are shown in Figure 25:
Greater cvPL corresponds to greater cvT	
  propagation.
----- Insert Figures 23, 24, and 25 about here ----Table 4 presents a qualitative summary of the relationship between link density
and cvT	
  propagation as mediated by average path length, number of alternative paths,
and cvPL. Essentially, greater link density decreases average path length, which in turn
increases cvT	
  propagation. This effect is neutralized, however, by an increase in the
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number of alternative paths and a decrease in	
  cvPL, both of which decreases cvT	
  
propagation. The combination of these effects explains why link density appears to have
little or no effect on cvT	
  propagation. It should be noted here that with increasing link
density, the decrease in average path length is greater than the decrease in cvPL, which
explains why the effect of average path length alone balances the effects of both cvPL and
number of alternative paths.
The effects of link density on cvT structural and cvT propagation	
  together
suggest that greater link density reduces a network’s overall sensitivity to random
perturbations. When an event’s causal structure is characterized by dense causal
relationships, it is relatively predictable.
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----4.4.2.2. Effect of centrality on cvT	
  propagation
As Figure 26 shows, greater network centralization corresponds to greater cvT	
  
propagation, but this effect disappears at high link density. Again, it is useful to examine
how the effect of network centralization on cvT	
  propagation is mediated by average path
length, number of alternative paths, and cvPL. As previously shown in Figure 13, greater
network centralization corresponds to smaller average path length. Greater network
centralization also corresponds to a smaller number of alternative paths, since
centralization redirects links towards hubs. Finally, as shown in Figure 27, greater
network centralization corresponds to smaller cvPL, except at high link density.
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----- Insert Figures 26 and 27 about here ----Table 5 presents a qualitative summary of the relationship between network
centralization and cvT	
  propagation as mediated by average path length, number of
alternative paths, and cvPL. Greater network centralization decreases average path length,
which in turn increases cvT	
  propagation. Similarly, greater network centralization
decreases the number of alternative paths,20 which also increases cvT	
  propagation.
Finally, greater network centralization decreases cvPL, which decreases cvT	
  propagation,
but this cvPL effect is not enough to counter the positive effects of average path length and
number of alternative paths such that the net effect of all three forces is an increase in cvT	
  
propagation.
----- Insert Table 5 about here ----It is interesting to note that while network centralization decreases cvT structural,
it increases cvT propagation. The effect of network centralization on cvT structural,
however, does not cancel out the effect of network centralization on cvT propagation;
even though greater network centralization corresponds to fewer structural variations,
each individual structure is still likely to have high cvT	
  propagation. There is thus a
positive relationship between network centralization and sensitivity to random
perturbations, and most of this sensitivity can be attributed to cvT	
  propagation. When an

20

This decrease in the number of alternative paths between trigger point and focal event nodes is likely to
be significant, particularly at low link density, but this decrease is too difficult to quantify for the purpose
of this paper.
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event’s causal structure is characterized by centralized causal relationships, the event
tends to be less predictable.
4.4.2.3. Effect of causal probability (pc) on cvT	
  propagation	
  
Figure 28 shows that pc has a weak effect on cvT	
  propagation at various levels of
link density and centrality. In theory, at positive values, greater pc should correspond to a
decrease in cvT	
  propagation, and when pc = 1, cvT	
  propagation should equal to 0. To
understand the relationship between pc and cvT	
  propagation better while isolating away
the effect of network structure, I run a signal propagation simulation on a simple linear
chain, similar to the one illustrated in Figure 23A. The results are shown in Figure 29:
Greater pc does correspond to smaller cvT	
  propagation, as expected. However, for the
range of pc values used in this paper (as indicated by the first five data points), the effects
are indeed small. As such, within the scope of this paper, pc is not a meaningful source of
variation.
----- Insert Figures 28 and 29 about here ----5. Four classes of structurally distinct events
The opposite ends of the two main structural parameters in the model, link density
and centrality, give rise to four classes of event structure networks: low-link-density-lowcentrality networks (LDLC), low-link-density-high-centrality networks (LDHC), highlink-density-low-centrality networks (HDLC), and high-link-density-high-centrality
networks (HDHC). Each of these four network types depicts how link density and
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centrality interact at their extreme values to produce structurally distinct events (Figure
30). In reality, some real-world events arise from a dense web of causal interactions and
others from just a few precursors. Similarly, some events arise from precursors that are
connected to each other via a random assortment of causal relationships, whereas others
arise from causal relationships defined by a small number of game changers. The choice
to focus on the extreme ends of centrality is particularly valid given the observation in
§4.1.2 that moderately-centralized networks are probably rare.
----- Insert Figure 30 about here ----Below, I briefly discuss the distinct characteristics of each of the four network
types to establish reference values for subsequent simulations on the interaction between
imperfect cognitive representation and causal structure. I first discuss structural
characteristics (network centralization, path length, and Jaccard similarity) and later each
network’s predictability as indicated by its sensitivity to random perturbations (cvT	
  
structural	
  and	
  cvT	
  propagation).
5.1. Network centralization
Figure 31 summarizes average network centralization for each of the four network
types. The results are straightforward: As intended, high-centrality networks are
characterized by high average network centralization (0.96 for LDHC and 0.83 for
HDHC), and low-centrality networks are characterized by low average network
centralization (0.10 for LDLC and 0.16 for HDLC). These values appear to be normally
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distributed with small variance. All pairs of values are significantly different from each
other (p < 0.01).
----- Insert Figure 31 about here ----5.2. Path length
Figure 32 summarizes average path length for each of the four network types.
Average path length for LDLC networks (2.90) is about 50% higher than those for the
other three network types (1.92 for LDHC, 1.91 for HDLC, and 1.80 for HDHC). Figure
33 summarizes the mean coefficient of variation of path length (cvPL) for each of the four
network types. Each value of mean cvPL describes the extent to which the distance
between any given pair of precursor nodes in a unique network structure tends to vary for
a given network type. Consistent with previous discussions in §4.4.1.1 and §4.4.1.2,
greater link density corresponds to a decrease in cvPL, and greater centrality has a stronger
negative effect on cvPL in low-link-density networks than in high-link-density networks.
All values appear to be normally distributed with small variance. All pairs of average
path length and cvPL values are significantly different from each other (p < 0.01).
----- Insert Figures 32 and 33 about here ----5.3. Jaccard similarity
Measuring Jaccard similarity in each type of network is helpful for understanding
how the effects of big-picture bias are expected to vary in different event network
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structures. As shown in Figure 34, mean Jaccard similarity is the highest for LDHC
networks. Such networks have a star-like topology (Figure 30) such that most peripheral
precursor nodes share a common connection with each other to the central precursor
node, thereby increasing overall structural similarity among precursor nodes in the
network. In general, since centralization increases the number of common connections
among precursor nodes, greater centrality results in higher Jaccard similarity.
Furthermore, as the comparison between low-link-density and high-link-density networks
points out, greater link density also appears to result in higher Jaccard similarity. This is
because the addition of links increases redundancy in the network, which again increases
the number of common connections among precursor nodes. All Jaccard similarity values
appear to be normally distributed with small variance. All pairs of values are significantly
different from each other (p < 0.01).
----- Insert Figure 34 about here ----5.4. Predictability: Sensitivity to random perturbations
5.4.1. Structural variation
To measure each network type’s tendency to produce structural variation, I
employ a method similar to the one described in §4.4.1 and quantify structural variation
using the measure cvT	
  structural. As shown in Figure 35, cvT	
  structural is the highest for
LDLC networks and the lowest for HDLC and HDHC networks. These results are
consistent with previous findings that the effect of link density on cvT	
  structural
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suppresses the effect of centralization, and furthermore that at low link density, greater
centralization corresponds to smaller cvT	
  structural. Overall, LDLC networks are indeed
expected to be the most prone ones to structural variation. All pairs of cvT	
  structural
values are significantly different from each other (p < 0.01), except for between HDLC
and HDHC networks (p = 0.96).
----- Insert Figure 35 about here ----5.4.2. Stochasticity in signal propagation
To measure each network type’s sensitivity to stochasticity in signal propagation,
I employ a method similar to the one described in §4.4.2 and quantify sensitivity to
stochasticity in signal propagation using the measure cvT	
  propagation. As shown in
Figure 36, cvT	
  propagation is the highest for LDHC networks (statistically significant at
p	
  < 0.01), and similar in value for all the other three networks (no significant difference
from each other; p > 0.20). There are at least two factors that contribute to LDHC
networks’ sensitivity to stochasticity in signal propagation: low average path length and
low number of alternative paths (Figures 23 and 24). The task of producing consistently
accurate forecasts is therefore the most difficult in LDHC networks, even when the exact
causal structure is fully known.
----- Insert Figure 36 about here -----
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6. Types of imperfect cognitive representation and their effects on forecast
performance
In this section, I discuss how each of the five types of imperfect cognitive
representation (as first discussed in §2.2) influences forecast performance. Each of them
translates into a particular kind of discrepancy between the event structure network and
the cognitive representation network. Furthermore, to understand the interaction between
imperfect cognitive representation type and event causal structure, I compare the effects
of imperfect cognitive representation on forecast performance across the four network
types introduced in §5 above.
I measure forecast performance by comparing forecasted latency (T’) to “actual”
latency (T) for each unique pair of event and cognitive representation network structures.
This comparison is normalized by the sum of T and T’ and subsequently squared to
produce a normalized squared error. I then take the mean of these normalized squared
errors (abbreviated MNSE) from all pairs of event and cognitive representation network
structures within the same network type. In summary:
1
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In this paper, since I run simulations on 50 unique pairs of structures for each
network type, n = 50. Similar to the description in §4.4.1, I repeat the simulation 100
times for each unique cognitive representation structure in order to obtain an average T’
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(as described in §4.4.1). The process of obtaining T differs between §6.1 and §6.2
through §6.5: In §6.1, the effects of rewiring are benchmarked against average values of
T that are obtained through 100 repetitions, whereas in §6.2-§6.5, the effects of each
respective type of imperfect cognitive representation are benchmarked against T obtained
from a single signal propagation instance. Note that	
  in	
  §6.1, tf = 0 and the goal is to
understand the effect of deviation from a structural template, whereas in §6.2 through
§6.5, tf > 0 and the goal is to understand the effect of deviation from a particular signal
propagation instance.
In each of the subsections below, I first look at the overall effect of imperfect
cognitive representation on forecast performance by examining the size of error (MNSET)
in each of the four network types. I then measure the slope of each MNSET regression line
to understand how easy it is to distinguish the forecast performance of forecasting agents
with severe versus mild cases of imperfect cognitive representation. Finally, I compare
both the overall size and slope of MNSET	
  across network types to understand how the
effects of a particular type of imperfect cognitive representation might be dependent on
the structural features of an event.
6.1. Imperfect understanding of structural relationships between event precursors
Figure 37A shows that greater rewiring probability (w) value corresponds to
greater forecast error (MNSET). Figure 37B further shows that as w becomes larger, the
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variance of forecast error also becomes larger.21, 22 These results suggest that when a
number of forecasters are similarly ignorant about the event’s causal structure, the more
structurally ignorant they get, the more widely different their forecasts are likely to be.
Another possible interpretation of these results is that as a single forecaster becomes
more structurally ignorant, that forecaster’s forecast becomes in itself more
unpredictable.
----- Insert Figure 37 about here ----Figure 37A also shows that w hurts forecast performance more in low-linkdensity than in high-link-density networks. Between the two kinds of low-link-density
networks, w hurts forecast performance more in low-link-density-high-centrality (LDHC)
than in low-link-density low-centrality (LDLC) networks. In contrast, not only does w
hurt forecast performance less in high-link-density networks, no statistically significant
difference is observed between the effects of w in high-link-density-low-centrality
(HDLC) and in high-link-density-high-centrality (HDHC) networks. These results are
consistent with previous findings that link density trumps centrality (for example, as
shown in Figures 12, 13, 19, 26, 27): When link density is high, centrality has little effect
on other variables, including latency. Figures 37A and 37C together show that even
though w decreases network centralization (Cx) by similar amounts in LDHC and HDHC

21

Note, however, that the number of outliers (for example, as defined by (Q1 – (1.5 * IQR)) or (Q3 + (1.5 *
IQR))) does not necessarily increase with w.
22
The relationship between network type and variance, on the other hand, is unclear.
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networks, it has approximately three to four times the effects on MNSET	
  in LDHC than in
HDHC networks.
The slope of MNSET is also steeper for low-link-density than high-link-density
networks. In particular, it is steeper for LDHC than for LDLC networks. These results
suggest that it is easier to distinguish the forecast performance of a more structurally
ignorant forecaster from that of a less structurally ignorant forecaster in sparsely
connected than in densely connected networks, especially when the sparsely connected
networks are also highly centralized. Forecasters thus receive a relatively large payoff for
being structurally informed when the corresponding events arise from sparse causal
relationships and a relatively small one when the corresponding events arise from dense
causal relationships. As such, if being structurally informed imposes some cost, a
forecaster would be wise to weigh it against the potential payoff as hinted by the link
density of the event’s causal structure.
Overall, high-link-density networks are relatively insensitive to rewiring because
in such networks there are enough redundant paths for a signal to propagate from the
trigger point node to the focal event node. Rewiring may change the particular signal
propagation path, but not the average latency.23 Low-link-density networks, on the other
hand, do not benefit from such redundancy. Rewiring in LDHC networks is especially
impactful because it decreases network centralization, which given the lack of

23

It is helpful here to recall that multiple precursor nodes can be simultaneously activated at a given period.
As such, link density has a substantial effect on latency.
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redundancy tends to increase the distance between trigger point and focal event nodes
and therefore latency.
In summary, structural ignorance significantly hurts forecast performance in all
types of events. Its effects, however, are most substantial in events that arise from sparse
causal relationships, particularly when they are also centralized. Forecast performance in
events that arise from dense causal relationships, on the other hand, is relatively robust to
structural ignorance.
6.2. Lack of available information (due to forecast time)
The effect of forecast time (tf) is shown in Figure 38:24,25 Overall, later tf
corresponds to smaller MNSET (Figure 38A). The greater the amount of information that
is available about which precursor nodes are already activated, the smaller the number of
precursor nodes that are left inactivated in the cognitive representation network, which
translates into fewer degrees of freedom in estimating T’. Furthermore, Figure 38B shows
that later tf corresponds to smaller error variance. The interpretation is straightforward:
As more information becomes available, not only does forecast accuracy tend to improve,
forecasters also tend to produce more similar forecasts.
----- Insert Figure 38 about here -----

24

In this and subsequent subsections, if Ti ≤ tf, the corresponding data point (Ti’) is removed from the
dataset.
25
“Perfect cognition” in this case means that the forecast is made at T, which would result in MNSET = 0.
As such, Figure 38A fully captures the penalty for having an imperfect cognitive representation.
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The relative ordering of MNSET	
  values at tf = 0 across network types simply
reflects the relative levels of signal propagation variability among them. Indeed, this
ordering resembles the relative values of cvT	
  propagation	
  previously shown in Figure 36.	
  
Both cvT	
  propagation	
  and MNSET	
  values at tf = 0 are significantly higher for LDHC
networks and smaller at relatively similar levels for the other three network types. LDHC
networks are inherently more sensitive to stochasticity in signal propagation, and
consequently, baseline forecast errors tend to be larger in those networks. Accurate
forecasts are thus the most elusive in events that are characterized by sparse and
centralized causal relationships. In such structures, it matters a great deal whether and
when signal propagation reaches a hub (which is essentially a bottleneck), as it can
dramatically alter the speed and scope of subsequent propagation. In comparison, in highlink-density networks there tends to be redundant paths between any given pair of
precursor nodes, such that network centralization is less likely to create bottlenecks that
can contribute to erratic signal propagation.
MNSET slopes are similarly steep for LDHC, HDLC, and HDHC networks, and
noticeably more gradual for LDLC networks. This suggests that waiting for more
information offers quick payoffs in LDHC, HDLC, and HDHC networks, and only slow
payoffs in LDLC networks. One aspect of these results is unsurprising: As illustrated in
Figure 38C, signal propagation is the fastest in HDLC and HDHC networks and the
slowest in LDLC networks. It thus makes sense that MNSET slopes for HDLC and HDHC
networks are steeper than that for LDLC networks. The other aspect of the results is more
interesting: The slope for MNSET in LDHC networks is as steep as those in HDLC and
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HDHC networks even though signal propagation is clearly slower in LDHC networks
than in HDLC and HDHC networks (as shown in Figure 38C). This suggests that it takes
a smaller amount of new information to improve forecast performance in LDHC
networks than in HDLC or HDHC networks. In other words, equal amounts of new
information tend to reduce uncertainty to a greater degree in LDHC networks than in
HDLC or HDHC networks. This observation is encouraging; it points out that even
though signal propagation in LDHC networks is inherently the most fickle, forecast
performance in those networks is highly responsive to additional information. As such,
the difference in forecast performance between forecasters who possess more versus less
information should be the easiest to tell apart in LDHC networks.
In summary, waiting for more information offers quick payoffs in high-linkdensity event structures (regardless of centrality) as well as in high-centrality event
structures (regardless of link density). In contrast, it offers slow payoffs in events that
arise from sparse and random causal relationships. These effects are driven by the rate at
which event precursors get activated, which in turn depends on the causal structure
according to which they are connected to each other. Furthermore, information
availability appears to make the largest difference to forecast performance in events that
arise from sparse and centralized causal relationships. When making predictions about
such events, forecasters who can wait for more information to become available are likely
to substantially outperform those who cannot. There is one caveat in interpreting the
findings in this subsection: While they demonstrate the importance of information
availability for forecast performance, they say little, if anything, about the importance of
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information accuracy or specificity. It is possible that information about the extent of
network activation alone—as opposed to information about which specific precursor
nodes are activated—is sufficiently diagnostic of forecast performance. The simulations
discussed in §6.4 explore this issue.
6.3. Arbitrary lack of attention to available information
The effect of attention to available information (a) is shown in Figure 39: Overall,
greater a corresponds to smaller MNSET (Figure 39A). The explanation is
straightforward: Greater information completeness corresponds to greater forecast
performance. Figure 39B plots the error variance. In contrast to previous patterns
observed for the effects of rewiring and forecast time, the level of error variance appears
to be relatively stable across values of a. It is thus not much easier for forecasters to reach
a consensus when they are completely attentive versus when they are not.
----- Insert Figure 39 about here ----The relative error sizes across network types are once again reflective of the
relative cvT	
  propagation	
  values (Figure 36). MNSET is larger in low-link-density than in
high-link-density networks, and it is the largest in LDHC networks. Again, this suggests
that it is inherently more difficult to produce accurate forecasts about events that arise
from sparse causal relationships, especially when those causal relationships are also
centralized.
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Interestingly,	
  MNSET slopes for all four network types are approximately parallel
to each other, which implies that it is equally easy or difficult to distinguish the
performance of an attentive forecaster from that of an inattentive one in all four network
types. The extent to which a lack of attention affects forecast error thus appears to be
independent of structure. One thing to note here is that attention to available information
is operationalized as the probability that an activated precursor node stays activated at
forecast time.26 As such, the number of precursor nodes that get inactivated according to
a is proportional to the total number of precursor nodes that would have otherwise stayed
activated at forecast time—these numbers would differ across network types due to
differences in signal propagation rate. Overall, the effect of Δa on ΔMNSET appears to be
proportional to the change in extent of precursor node inactivation, and since the
operationalization of a ensures that the extent of precursor node inactivation is
proportionally matched across network types, the MNSET slopes are parallel to each
other.27
In summary, forecast errors due to inattentiveness tend to be greater in events that
arise from sparse causal relationships—particularly those relationships are also
centralized—due to baseline differences in sensitivity to signal propagation stochasticity.
The payoff for being more attentive is very similar across structurally distinct events. It
should be noted, however, that attentiveness in this case is measured in proportion to
26

For example, if a = 0.25, then each activated precursor node at forecast time has a 25% chance of staying
activated.
27
Furthermore, this effect appears to be independent of the extent of network activation. In another
experiment, I control for the number of activated precursor nodes at forecast time instead of the forecast
time itself, and I still observe parallel MNSET slopes.
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available information. Because there tends to be a greater amount of available
information in events that arise from denser causal relationships (controlling for forecast
time), the absolute cost of being more attentive is likely to be higher in those events. As
such, even though the payoff for being more attentive is similar given different event
structures, the cost-benefit ratio tends to be higher in events that arise from denser causal
relationships.
6.4. Big-picture bias in attention
As explained in §3.2.4, the idea of big-picture bias is modeled using the parameter
similarity threshold (s), whereby a forecasting agent is likely to confuse information
about one precursor node for that about another precursor node if those two precursor
nodes are structurally similar enough as indicated by a Jaccard index of greater than or
equal to s. A forecasting agent’s s determines the size of its “zone of confusion,” which I
measure as a portion of the size of the cognitive representation network. For example, if
twenty out of fifty precursor nodes in the cognitive representation network are potentially
confused for each other, then the size of the zone of confusion is 0.4. The higher s is, the
smaller the zone of confusion. One way to think about s is to see it in terms of “effort.” A
forecasting agent with a high s can be viewed as making a lot of effort to be
discriminating about information.
----- Insert Figure 40 about here -----
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The first thing to note about s is that it should have different effects in different
network structures. Figure 40C plots s against the size of zone of confusion in all four
network types and shows that s has the strongest effect on the size of zone of confusion in
LDLC networks, followed by HDLC, HDHC, and LDHC networks. This ranking
corresponds exactly to the average Jaccard similarity ranking shown in Figure 34. In
LDLC networks, because pairs of precursor nodes on average have very low Jaccard
similarities, a forecasting agent with a low s of, say, 0.1, includes only ~26% of all
precursor nodes in its zone of confusion. In comparison, at s = 0.1, a forecasting agent in
HDLC, HDHC, and LDHC networks includes ~57%, ~87%, and ~95% of all precursor
nodes in its zone of confusion, respectively. It is interesting to note as well that at s ~0.6
the size of zone of confusion is ~0 in all four network types. As such, when a forecasting
agent’s s is greater than or equal to 0.6, it virtually processes information about every
precursor node without any confusion in all four network types. In other words, a
forecasting agent does not have to expend effort greater than what corresponds to s = 0.6
in order to be completely discriminating about information.
Figure 40A shows that s has a relatively mild effect on MNSET overall. Keeping in
mind that the statistical evidence is weak, a comparison of MNSET	
  slopes shows that s has
the largest relative effect in LDLC networks, followed by LDHC and HDLC networks,
and no effect in HDHC networks. The performance of a big-picture forecaster is thus the
most distinguishable from that of a detailed-oriented forecaster in LDLC networks,
followed by LDHC and HDLC networks. The two types of forecasters are virtually
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indistinguishable in HDHC networks. The relative error sizes across network types once
again correspond to their relative cvT	
  propagation	
  values (Figure 36). Figure 40B shows
that the level of error variance is relatively stable across values of s, which is not
surprising given the mild effect of s on MNSET overall. Forecasters are thus likely to
produce equally differing forecasts regardless of how discriminating they are about
information.
The effect of s on MNSET corresponds to the level of path dependency in a given
network type. In a network that is completely free of path dependency, s would have no
effect; substituting one activated precursor node for another would have no implication
for latency.28 The results above thus suggest that low-link-density networks, especially
LDLC networks, are more path-dependent than high-link-density networks. To
understand these results, it is helpful to examine several aspects of the relationship
between structure and path dependency: First, low-link-density networks should be more
path-dependent than high-link-density networks because the latter are characterized by
greater redundancy. Redundant paths can buffer against the effect of completely random
substitution of activated precursor nodes (e.g., at s = 0). Second, low-centrality networks
should be more path-dependent than high-centrality networks because the latter tend to
have more symmetrical components in their structures. Symmetrical components, just
like redundant paths, can buffer against the effect of random substitution of activated
precursor nodes. Third, the extent of network activation matters: If a large portion of

28

For comparison, consider a simple linear chain (similar to the one illustrated in Figure 23A). In this type
of structure, there is clearly path dependency, and s would have a significant effect on MNSET.
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precursor nodes in the network have been activated at forecast time, then the window
between forecast time and time of event occurrence is so narrow that not much “path
dependency” can exist. All these three aspects combine to explain why low-link-density
networks, particularly LDLC networks, are more path-dependent than high-link-density
networks. Not only do LDLC networks lack redundant paths and symmetrical
components in their structures, they also tend to have fewer activated precursor nodes at
forecast time (assuming that forecast time is matched across network types, as is the case
for the simulations discussed here), thereby leaving plenty of room for distinct signal
propagation paths to emerge.
In summary, as with the other types of imperfect cognitive representation, due to
baseline differences in sensitivity to signal propagation stochasticity, forecast errors
overall tend to be greater in events that arise from sparse causal relationships, particularly
when they are also centralized. In terms of forecast performance differential between bigpicture and detail-oriented forecasters, however, being more detail-oriented yields the
greatest payoff given events that arise from sparse and random causal relationships.
Interestingly, in an event structure that is sparse and random, precursor nodes tend to be
structurally dissimilar anyway such that distinguishing them requires relatively little
effort. In contrast, in an event structure that is dense and centralized, being more detailoriented yields little payoff, and yet event precursors in such a structure tend to be more
structurally similar, such that distinguishing them requires some effort. The implication
for forecasting strategy is clear: If the cost of effort is non-negligible, a forecaster will do
well to be detail-oriented in event structures that are characterized by sparse and random
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causal relationships and to be big-picture in event structures that are characterized by
dense and centralized causal relationships. One caveat here though is that in order to
make a reasonably accurate prediction, a forecaster still needs to have an accurate
cognitive representation of the extent of network activation (i.e., the portion of precursor
nodes in the network that have been activated).
6.5. Temporal bias in attention
The effect of preference for newer vs. older information (b) is shown in Figure
41: Overall, positive b (i.e., preference for newer information) corresponds to smaller
MNSET, except for LDHC networks (Figure 41A). Controlling for the amount of
information that is taken into consideration, forecasting agents that prefer newer
information tend to do better than those that prefer older information. As before, the
relative error sizes across network types correspond to their relative cvT	
  propagation	
  
values (Figure 36): Overall, the largest errors are seen in LDHC networks, followed by
LDLC networks and both types of high-link-density networks. Figure 41B shows that the
level of error variance is similar between positive and negative values of b. Forecasters
are thus likely to produce equally differing forecasts whether they prefer newer or older
information.
----- Insert Figure 41 about here ----MNSET	
  slopes suggest that the effects of b are similarly mild in LDLC, HDLC,
and HDHC networks. Despite their mildness, these effects are statistically significant (p
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< 0.10 for LDLC networks and	
  p < 0.01 for the high-link-density networks). In LDHC
networks, b appears to have no effect.
In interpreting these results, it is helpful to understand several factors that
influence the effect of b on MNSET. Some of these factors are similar to those that
influence the relationship between structure and path dependency discussed in the
previous section. It should be noted, however, that unlike the effect of s, the effect of b on
MNSET is only indirectly indicative of path dependency. The effect of b comes from the
difference between how far away early precursor nodes (which represent old information)
are from the focal event node and how far away late precursor nodes (which represent
new information) are from the focal event node.29 This difference, in turn, is correlated
with path dependency in the network structure; the more path-dependent a network is, the
greater the probability that the difference between early and late precursor nodes is
large.30
The first factor that influences the effect of b on MNSET is link density. A densely
connected network has short path lengths as well as redundant paths, both of which lower
the probability that the difference between early and late precursor nodes is large. The
second factor is network centralization. Centralization tends to lower path lengths, which
in turn lowers the probability that the difference between early and late precursor nodes is
29

“Far away” here refers to temporal distance, i.e., how much time it would take for a signal to propagate
between precursor nodes. This depends on path length, number of alternative paths, and causal probability.
30
For example, consider a simple linear chain of at least a moderate size. Such a chain is highly pathdependent. Here, a relatively large distance separates early precursor nodes from late precursor nodes. In
contrast, consider a perfect star or a complete network. Such networks are not path-dependent, and early
precursor nodes are very close to late precursor nodes. (In fact, all precursor nodes are very close to each
other.)
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large. Nevertheless, since link density trumps centrality, the effect of centralization is
likely to be visible only when link density is low. The third factor is the extent of network
activation (i.e., the amount of available information). If only a small number of precursor
nodes have been activated by forecast time, forecasting agents with a preference for
newer information and forecasting agents with a preference for older information are both
likely to pay attention to similar subsets of information, thereby neutralizing the effect of
b.31 The fourth factor is causal probability. There is an interesting tradeoff here: Low
causal probability means that the extent of network activation at a given forecast time is
likely to be low, which tends to neutralize the effect of b. Low causal probability,
however, also increases the temporal difference between early and late precursor nodes,
controlling for path length. Because of these opposing mechanisms, the overall effect of
causal probability is non-monotonic. There is an optimal causal probability value at
which the effect of b is the strongest, and this value depends on the particular network
structure as well as forecast time. Since signal propagation is slower in low-link-density
networks than in high-link-density networks, optimal causal probability values are likely
to be higher for low-link-density networks than they are for high-link-density networks.
Based on the understanding above, the effect of b should be stronger in event
structures that are characterized by sparse and random causal relationships than in those
characterized by dense and centralized causal relationships. Furthermore, the effect of b

31

Note, however, that the extent of network activation (i.e., the amount of available information) itself has
no direct effect on the amount of information that the forecasting agent takes into its consideration. Given
the same magnitude of b, a forecasting agent is likely to take into consideration the same amount of
information regardless of how much information is actually available.
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should be stronger at later than earlier forecast time. And finally, there is an optimal
causal probability value at which the effect of b is the strongest. The data shown in
Figure 41 are obtained from simulations in which tf = 5. The extent of network
centralization is likely to be sufficiently high for high-link-density networks but very low
for low-link-density networks. This is why the effects of b appear to be stronger (at least
in terms of statistical evidence) for high-link-density networks than for low-link-density
networks, despite the role of link density in lowering path lengths and increasing
redundant paths. Furthermore, b has no effect on MNSET in LDHC networks because not
only is the extent of network activation low at forecast time, high centralization in those
networks lowers path lengths and creates symmetry. And finally, there is virtually no
difference between the effects of b on MNSET in HDLC and in HDHC networks because
at high link density, differences in centrality are muted.
In summary, the effects of temporal bias on forecast performance depend on the
confluence of many factors. Given most causal structures, forecasters are likely to do
better when they prefer newer rather than older information, but the amount of payoff
varies depending on the actual structure as well as on temporal elements, such as forecast
time and causal probability. Only in event structures characterized by sparse and
centralized causal relationships does the effect of temporal bias appear to be stable; in
these event structures, temporal bias has little or no effect on forecast performance.
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6.6. Summary of simulation results
6.6.1. Two blades of the scissors: Forecasting mechanism and forecasting
environment
The simulation results discussed in §6.1-§6.5 above demonstrate why it is
important to study both blades of Simon’s scissors. Depending on the dependent variable
or the type of imperfect cognitive representation in question, the results show instances of
environmental determinism but also of environmental indeterminism (cf. Aldrich, 1979;
Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985). The causal structure of an event is sometimes sufficient and
yet sometimes unnecessary for predicting forecast errors. At other times, forecast errors
depend on the particular interaction between the type of imperfect cognitive
representation and the causal structure of the event.
There is a high degree of environmental determinism when the dependent variable
is overall forecast errors (MNSET): As shown in Figures 37 through 41, when forecasters
make predictions about events that arise from sparse and centralized causal relationships,
they tend to produce relatively large overall forecast errors. In contrast, when forecasters
make predictions about events that arise from dense causal relationships, they tend to
produce relatively small overall forecast errors. In general, prediction appears to be more
inherently difficult when it concerns events that are characterized by sparse rather than
dense causal relationships, particularly when those sparse relationships are also
centralized. This observation holds across all five types of imperfect cognitive
representation.
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When it comes to evaluating the forecast error differentials (MNSET slopes)
between forecasters of varying levels of imperfect cognitive representations (i.e., mild vs.
severe), environmental determinism fades away. As summarized in Table 6, forecast
error differentials can usually be spotted more easily when the event in question arises
from sparser causal relationships. In other words, imperfect cognitive representation often
has a larger marginal effect on forecast errors in sparser networks. Link density endows
networks with redundant paths, which can help to buffer against the effects of structural
ignorance, big-picture attention bias, and temporal bias (specifically the privileging of
dated information). With regards to other types of imperfect cognitive representation,
however, forecast error differentials can actually be spotted more easily when the event in
question arises from denser causal relationships. For instance, since link density allows
information to unfold quickly, forecast time has a larger effect on forecast errors in
events that arise from denser causal relationships. In a densely connected network, a short
wait for more information can substantially improve forecast performance.
Of the five types of imperfect cognitive representation discussed in this paper, the
only one whose effects on forecast errors is independent of event structure is arbitrary
lack of attention. In this instance of environmental indeterminism, forecasting agents that
arbitrarily miss equal proportions of available information in structurally distinct events
tend to produce similar levels of forecast error.
----- Insert Table 6 about here -----
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Overall, no consistent pattern is observed with regards to the relationship between
forecast error differentials (MNSET slopes) and event structure. The steepest and gentlest
MNSET slopes can be found in any network type depending on the type of imperfect
cognitive representation. The ease with which forecasters’ performance can be
distinguished based on the level of severity of their imperfect cognitive representation
can thus vary within the same event structure. Each type of event structure is particularly
sensitive to at least one type of imperfect cognitive representation and particularly robust
to at least another (Table 7). For example, events that arise from sparse and centralized
causal relationships are relatively sensitive to structural ignorance but relatively robust to
temporal bias (specifically the privileging of dated information). Based on this
understanding, forecasters who have some awareness about the event’s causal structure
can be more mindful about avoiding certain types of imperfect cognitive representation
and less mindful about others. On the assumption that there is a cost to improving one’s
cognitive representation, forecasters can thereby more wisely manage their resource
expenditures.
----- Insert Table 7 about here ----6.6.2. Uncertainty reduction
The simulation results also underscore an important point: As long as an event has
not completely unfolded and there is some degree of randomness in the way in which its
precursors are activated, complete and accurate information about the present state of the
event’s causal structure can still yield substantially erroneous (and erratic) prediction
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about its future state. In a similar vein, multiple forecasters who hold the same perfect
knowledge about the present state of an event’s causal structure can still produce vastly
different forecasts. Beyond knowledge about an event’s structural attributes as explored
in this paper, there is room for further uncertainty reduction (cf. Keynes, 1921).
One way in which uncertainty can be reduced is by simply waiting for the event
to unfold some more. Common sense suggests that the ability to wait for more
information would be the most valuable when the event in question is especially
unpredictable. The results discussed in §6.2 show that this is indeed the case. Events that
arise from sparse and centralized causal relationships are highly sensitive to stochasticity
in signal propagation; of the four types of structurally distinct events, they are inherently
the most difficult to predict. As discussed in §6.2, in such events, a relatively small
addition of available information results in a relatively large forecast error reduction.
6.6.3. Path dependency
The matter of path dependency is worth recapping. As discussed in §6.4,
controlling for forecast time, networks with high link density or high centralization tend
to be less path-dependent due to symmetrical components, redundant paths, and fast
signal propagation. Interestingly, these same factors render forecast performance in those
networks sensitive to the extent of network activation (i.e., the amount of available
information). Therefore, even though a lack of path-dependency implies some
insensitivity to information accuracy or specificity, it should not be mistaken for
insensitivity to information availability in general. Correspondingly, even though
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forecasters who make predictions about events that are characterized by dense or
centralized causal relationships can be less cautious about knowing which specific event
precursors have been activated, it is still critical that they are acutely aware of new event
precursors being activated in general.
6.6.4. Link density trumps centrality
Finally, it is useful to remember once more that link density trumps centrality.
When link density is high, centrality has little or no effect on almost all other variables.
Because of this, the effects of imperfect cognitive representation on forecast performance
in the two types of high-link-density networks—high-centrality and low-centrality—are
often difficult to tell apart, both in terms of overall forecast error (MNSET) and forecast
error differentials (MNSET slopes). A forecaster would thus be wise to prioritize having a
correct assessment of link density over that of centrality. The latter is only important
when the event arises from sparse causal relationships.
7. Takeaways for forecasters
The simulation results suggest that it is worthwhile for forecasters to understand
an event’s causal structure not only because it helps to improve forecast performance, but
also because it helps them to more strategically manage their effort. In this section, I
discuss how the theoretical findings of this paper may translate into practical advice for
real-world forecasters.
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The first step that a forecaster should take when given a prediction task is to ask
what the conceivable precursors are to the event in question. This is certainly no easy
feat. No real-world forecaster is omniscient. Even ex-post, only a subset of all possible
precursors to an event is revealed. Nevertheless, when a forecaster’s prediction task
concerns man-made events (as opposed to natural events, such as meteorological or
geological phenomena), one way to think more concretely about those events’ precursors
is to think about the people who influence the decision-making processes that underlie
those events. For instance, if the event in question is an election, a forecaster could look
at voters, funders, backers, and opinion leaders—among others—as reasonable proxies
for event precursors. If the event in question is an organizational action, a forecaster
could gather some information about who the relevant decision makers are in that
organization.
As pointed out in various parts of this paper (e.g., in §4.1.1, §4.4.1.2, §4.4.2.2,
and §6.6.4), link density is a dominant attribute of an event’s causal structure.
Correspondingly, the second step that a forecaster should take is to estimate the density
of causal relationships among event precursors. There is a parallel here between the
concept of link density and that of interdependency, which has often been discussed in
the organizational structure literature using the NK model (Kauffman, 1987; Levinthal,
1997; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Link density is high when there is a high degree of
interdependency among precursors.
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The level of interdependency among decision makers may be hinted at by the
number of formal and informal communication channels that are available between them.
This may in turn depend on the availability of communication technologies as well as
factors such as organizational structure and leadership culture. In the election example
above, the level of internet adoption among voters may be influential in determining how
interdependent their actions are. In the organizational action example, how siloed an
organization is can offer some clues about how likely it is that the action of an
organizational actor influences that of another. To put this in more concrete terms,
consider Apple versus Gore: Apple is defined by a culture of secrecy, not only externally
at the interface between the firm and the public, but also internally between employees
(Nocera, 2008). It has been well-documented that in order to maintain project
confidentiality, Apple employees are often assigned to work on modules without clear
information about how those modules are supposed to interact; an employee in charge of
one module is sometimes even left in the dark about which other employees are
responsible for the other modules. In stark contrast, Gore is well known for its extremely
flat organizational structure, entrepreneurial culture, and open communication (Daft,
1992). Furthermore, throughout its history, Gore has made explicit efforts to facilitate
openness via customized technologies, such as a digital voice exchange called Gorecom.
A forecaster who attempts to make predictions about Apple’s action can thus assume that
it entails rather sparse causal relationships, whereas a forecaster who attempts to make
predictions about Gore’s action can assume that it entails dense causal relationships.
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Once a forecaster has some idea about the level of link density in an event’s
causal structure, the third step to take is to evaluate the degree of centralization. If a
forecaster has determined that the level of link density is high, however, there is not
much need to make assessments about centralization. As pointed out in §6.6.4, there is
not much of a difference between the behaviors of high-link-density-low-centrality
(HDLC) and high-link-density-high-centrality (HDHC) structures. When link density is
high, a forecaster thus has an opportunity to conserve some energy.
When link density is low, however, the degree of centralization matters.
Organizational structure and leadership culture again have some clues to offer in this
regard. To continue with the previous example of Apple, one could compare the era of
Steve Jobs to that of Tim Cook. As is widely known, much decision-making at Apple
during Jobs’s era was controlled by Jobs himself, whereas in Cook’s era, it is distributed
more evenly across several high-level executives (Isaacson, 2011). Given the simulation
results, a forecaster could thus say that making predictions about Apple’s actions would
be more difficult with Jobs rather than Cook at the helm.
The task above of figuring out an event’s causal structure, i.e., which of the four
archetypes it resembles, is arguably the most difficult part of translating the theoretical
findings of this paper into practice. The rest is more straightforward. Forecasters could
refer to Tables 6 and 7 to understand which sources of imperfect cognitive imperfection
they should or should not be wary about: Ignorance about the exact causal relationships
among precursors is more dangerous when link density in the event structure is low, and
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less so when link density in the event structure is high. The ability to postpone prediction
in order to wait for more information is the most valuable when link density is low and
centralization is high, though it is also valuable when link density is high, regardless of
centralization. Paying attention to new news is always important since arbitrary lack of
attention always confers a penalty regardless of event structure. Attention to detail in
terms of which precursor a piece of information specifically pertains to is particularly
important when link density and centralization are both low. Paying attention to recent
information is generally more helpful than paying attention to old information in all types
of event structure. Lastly, as summarized in Table 7, each structure is particularly
sensitive to a source of imperfect cognitive representation but also particularly robust to
another.
Much of the discussion in this section is based on treating the decision-making
process as a proxy for causal relationship. In particular, I focus on decision-making that
occurs internally within an organization. This is admittedly a simplification, though
hopefully a reasonably illustrative one. In reality, forecasters need to take into account
external factors as well, such as constraints imposed by the regulatory environment or
elements of the organization’s value chain. Furthermore, the mapping from decision
makers to event precursors is unlikely to be perfect. While the two are most likely
correlated, forecasters still need to be mindful of the ways in which they differ. For
instance, not all events result from decisions; some events may simply follow from other
events or even take place spontaneously.
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8. Limitations and Extensions
There are three ways in which additional work could expand the usefulness of this
paper: first and perhaps most importantly, as I discuss in §8.1 below, empirical validation
is crucial for evaluating the soundness of the model as well as to inform further
modifications; second, as I discuss in §8.2, alternative modeling choices should be
explored as they could reveal not only the consequences of alternative assumptions but
also which of those assumptions turn out to be critical; third, as I discuss in §8.3,
additional features could be built on top of the current model and additional analyses
could be performed to investigate research questions that the current model and set of
analyses are underequipped to answer.
8.1. Empirical validation
Given its speculative nature, this paper’s full contribution can only be realized
through rigorous empirical validation. As discussed in §7 above, the relational structure
of decision-makers appears to be a reasonable proxy for an event’s causal structure and
thus a good starting point for empirical efforts.
This paper makes claims in two stages. Correspondingly, those claims should be
validated separately and in sequence: First, this paper suggests that the causal structure of
an event predicts its occurrence probability, latency, and predictability (Figures 8 through
29; Tables 3 through 5). Here, there are two separate questions, i.e., whether there is any
predictive relationship at all between any part of an event’s causal structure and any
131

characteristic of its occurrence, and whether the nature of the predictive relationships is
as shown by the model.
Second, this paper suggests that a forecaster’s cognitive representation of an event
can be modeled quite minimalistically as a semi-faithful replica of the “real world.”
Clearly, it is challenging to fully validate this claim without (or even with) the luxury of
launching a full-blown neuroscientific study. Nevertheless, there are at least two outputs
of the model that could be empirically validated: First, though the data are not shown or
discussed in this paper, each particular type of imperfect cognitive representation, on
average, results in forecast errors in a particular direction, i.e., they reflect either an
underestimation or overestimation of event occurrence latency. At the minimum,
empirical validation of this component of the data would offer some indication of the
soundness of the cognitive representation model. Second, the model suggests that
different types of imperfect cognitive representation result in forecast errors of different
magnitudes given events of structurally different causal structures (Figures 30 through
41; Tables 6 and 7). This is more complicated to study in the empirical setting: It is
important to first of all identify or artificially construct events that reliably represent each
of the four structurally distinct event classes (§5). Here, the relational structure of
decision-makers might again be a reasonable proxy for an event’s causal structure. Only
then could the relative magnitudes of forecast errors from the different types of imperfect
cognitive representation be matched against the patterns shown in the simulation results.
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8.2. Alternative modeling choices
In the current model, causality is represented as a simple signal propagation
mechanism, whereby one precursor node activates another precursor node. There are at
least three simplifying assumptions in this regard that should be examined further:
First, the current model allows each link to represent only positive causal
probability. In other words, a precursor node can only activate another precursor node but
not deactivate or suppress it. This is certainly not how reality works; one precursor can
trigger, terminate, or halt another precursor.32 The implications of modifying the model to
incorporate these features are likely to be complex. Among the intriguing possibilities is
that areas of the network may end up perpetually oscillating between activation and
deactivation such that the focal event node never gets activated. It would be interesting to
see the extent to which the simulation results change given this modification; it would
indicate whether the assumption on which the current model is based is a critical one.
Second, the model assumes that a precursor node can be activated by any one of
its neighboring precursor nodes. In reality, a cluster of precursors may sometimes be
required to activate another precursor. To investigate this particular attribute of causality,
a network structure different from the one used in the current model may be more
appropriate. For instance, the small-world network can be tuned according to its
clustering coefficient (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), which makes it a promising alternative
32

There is a comparable model in epidemiology called the SIR model (Kermack & McKendrick, 1932), in
which S stands for Susceptible, I for Infected, and R for Recovered (i.e., immune). The classic cellular
automata model (e.g., Wolfram, 1994) is another useful reference.
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model. Indeed, this model would allow new structural predictors of event occurrence to
be discovered.
Third, in the current model, once a precursor node is activated, it stays activated.
In reality, precursors are certainly not activated forever. At some point, a precursor may
spontaneously deactivate. The current model can be modified such that an activated
precursor would automatically deactivate after some time has passed. The extent to which
this feature changes the simulation results would again reveal the criticality of the
assumptions involved.
8.3. Additional features and analyses
8.3.1. Other sources of imperfect cognitive representation
As discussed in §2.1.3, event precursors differ in terms of how influential they are
in driving event occurrence. Correspondingly, forecasters may be more familiar with
central rather than peripheral event precursors. One possible reason for this is because in
reality, central event precursors tend to receive greater news coverage than peripheral
ones. For instance, in discussing a political event that involves Russia, the average person
would likely (and perhaps correctly) guess that Vladimir Putin’s actions occupy relatively
central positions in the event’s causal structure. Forecasters also differ in terms of their
expertise about an event, however, such that an expert forecaster may be more familiar
with peripheral event precursors than a lay forecaster is. Relatedly, an expert forecaster
may also better understand which event precursors are central and which are peripheral.
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Precursor node centrality is thus a potential source of attention bias that has not
been covered in this paper. Given limited attention, what would happen if a forecaster
pays attention only to central event precursors? Would such a forecaster be able to spare
some effort and yet still produce sufficiently accurate forecasts? Similarly, what would
happen if a forecaster has only a limited amount of attention but (perhaps due to a lack of
expertise) is unable to be discriminating about the relative centrality of event precursors?
Or what would happen if a forecaster for some reason has a tendency to be intrigued by
obscure news and consequently overestimates the importance of peripheral event
precursors? These are some interesting research questions that the model could help
answer with relatively simple modifications.
8.3.2. Team forecasting and mixture of imperfect cognitive representations
The issue of cost of effort is mentioned casually in several parts of this paper
(e.g., in §6.3, §6.4, and §6.6.1). Removing or lessening a cognitive imperfection
presumably takes some effort and is not costless. This is a relevant issue in real-world
forecasting and thus deserving of a systematic examination. It is particularly interesting
to consider the issue of cost of effort in the context of team forecasting or when multiple
sources of imperfect cognitive representation contribute to one prediction.
As shown in Tables 6 and 7 (and discussed in §6.6.1), a given type of causal
structure is particularly sensitive to at least one type of imperfect cognitive representation
and particularly robust to at least another. These results suggest that when the event’s
causal structure is known and resources are limited, some sources of imperfect cognitive
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representation should be avoided and others ignored. Given a pool of forecasters who
each tends to think with a particular bias, these results can inform the optimal team
composition. Such a composition can likely be revealed simply using the current model
and simulation setup but with additional statistical analyses.
9. Conclusion
In addition to all the results that have been discussed thus far, one contribution of
the paper that I wish to highlight in conclusion is that it offers a way to predict the
predictability of an event. Some events are easier to predict than others, but this typically
only becomes evident ex-post. While it is possible to look at historical data about a
particular category of events and statistically estimate its predictability, there are events
for which historical data do not exist. This paper takes a different approach; it suggests
that there are attributes of an ongoing event that may allow for ex-ante prediction of its
predictability. Nevertheless, it cannot be emphasized enough that without empirical
validation, much of this paper’s contribution remains merely hypothetical. At the same
time, I hope that this paper delivers on its promise to provide some navigational cues to
empirical researchers who wish to unpack the black box of causality in forecasting.
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES

Table 1: Mapping of terminologies used in Chapter 3
Terminology used in theoretical discussion
Corresponding terminology or parameter used in
(§1-§2)
the model/simulation (§3-§6)
General
Forecasting environment/event
Event network
Forecaster’s cognitive representation of the event
Cognitive representation network
Precursor/preceding event
Precursor node
Trigger point
Trigger point node
Focal event
Focal event node
Independent variables that describe the event’s causal structure
Number of precursors
Network size (N)
Link density
Link density (D)
Centralization
Centrality parameter (C) and network centralization
(Cx)*
Causal probability
Causal probability (pc)
Independent variables that describe the forecaster’s cognitive representation of the event
Imperfect understanding of structural relationships
Rewiring (w)
between event precursors
Lack of available information (due to forecast time)
Forecast time (tf)
Arbitrary lack of attention to available information
Attention (a)
Big-picture bias in attention
Similarity threshold (s)
Temporal bias in attention
Temporal bias (b)
Dependent variables about the event
Probability of event occurrence
Probability of event occurrence (pe)
Latency of event occurrence
Latency (T)
Predictability of event occurrence
Sensitivity to random perturbations:
• Coefficient of variation of T due to structural
variation (cvT	
  structural)
• Coefficient of variation of T due to
stochasticity in signal propagation (cvT	
  
propagation)
Dependent variable about the forecast
Forecast performance/prediction accuracy/forecast
Mean normalized squared error of T (MNSET)
error
*Centrality parameter (C) is a network generation parameter (see §3.1.1), whereas Cx measures how centralized the resulting network
is (see §4.1).
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Table 2: Independent and dependent variables in the simulations
Model component

Event structure
network
(§4 and §5)

Cognitive
representation
network (§6)

Independent variables

•

Density parameter (D)
Centrality parameter (C) and
network centralization (Cx)
Causal probability (pc)

•
•
•
•
•

Rewiring (w)
Forecast time (tf)
Attention (a)
Similarity threshold (s)
Temporal bias (b)

•
•

Dependent variables
•
•
•

Probability of event occurrence (pe)
Latency (T)
Predictability (sensitivity to random
perturbations)
o Coefficient of variation of T due to
structural variation (cvT structural)
o Coefficient of variation of T due to
stochasticity in signal propagation (cvT
propagation)

•

Mean normalized squared error of latency
(MNSET)
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Table 3: Effects of event structure parameters on event occurrence probability,
latency, and predictability

Link density (D)
Centrality (C)

Probability (pe)
+
+

Effect on
Latency (T)
-

Causal probability (pc)

+

-

Parameter

Predictability
+
N/A in this paper,
otherwise +
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Table 4: Effect of density parameter (D) on cvT	
  propagation as mediated by
average path length, number of alternative paths, and cvPL	
  
Effect of density parameter (D) on:
Average path length: Decrease
Number of alternative paths: Increase
cvPL: Decrease
	
  

Final effect on cvT	
  propagation	
  (strength)
Increase (strong)
Decrease (moderate)
Decrease (strong)
Net effect: Neutral
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Table 5: Effect of network centralization on cvT propagation as mediated by
average path length, number of alternative paths, and cvPL	
  
Effect of centrality on:
Average path length: Decrease
Number of alternative paths: Decrease
cvPL: Decrease
	
  

Final effect on cvT	
  propagation	
  (strength)
Increase (strong)
Increase (moderate)
Decrease (strong)
Net effect: Increase
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Table 6: Effects of imperfect cognitive representations on forecast error in
structurally distinct events
Source of error

+
°

LDLC

Network type
LDHC
HDLC

HDHC

Rewiring (w)

++

+++

+

+

Forecast time (tf)

+

+++

+++

+++

Attention (a)

+++

+++

+++

+++

Similarity threshold (s)

++

+

+

°

Temporal bias (b)

+

°

+

+

=
=

steepness of MNSET slope (more + is steeper)
flat
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Table 7: Forecasting environments and their points of sensitivity and robustness
Network type
LDLC
LDHC
HDLC
HDHC

Relatively sensitive to:
Similarity threshold (s)
Rewiring (w)
Forecast time (tf)
Forecast time (tf)

Relatively robust to:
Forecast time (tf)
Temporal bias (b)
Rewiring (w)
Rewiring (w), similarity threshold (s)
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APPENDIX 2: ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Mechanism of knowledge acquisition
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Figure 2: Knowledge acquisition model overview
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Figure 3: Distance sensitivity parameter
A. Given positive distance sensitivity, the exploitative agent performs better than
the explorative agent in terms of acquisition success rate.
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Figure 3: Distance sensitivity parameter (continued)
B. Distance sensitivity can diminish the explorative agent’s advantage over the
exploitative agent in terms of average path length.
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Figure 4: Magnitude sensitivity parameter
A. Magnitude sensitivity with distance sensitivity favors the exploitative agent in
terms of acquisition success rate.
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Figure 4 (continued)
B. Magnitude sensitivity with distance sensitivity hurts overall average path length.
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Figure 5: Age sensitivity parameter

A. Age sensitivity amplifies the effect of distance sensitivity in terms of acquisition
success rate. (Compare to Figure 3.)

B. Age sensitivity amplifies the effect of distance sensitivity in terms of average path
length. (Compare to Figure 3.)
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Figure 6: A set of events represented as a Bayesian network
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Figure 7: Event structure network and cognitive representation network
A. No rewiring (w = 0.00)

B. Partial rewiring (w = 0.50)

C. Full rewiring (w = 1.00)

Red = event structure network
Green = cognitive representation network
Yellow = trigger point node
Blue = focal event node.
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Figure 8: The effect of link density parameter (D) on network centralization (Cx) at
various centrality parameter (C) values and network size (N)	
  = 50
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Figure 9: The effect of centrality parameter (C) on network centralization (Cx) at
various link density parameter (D) values and network size (N) = 50
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Figure 10: Link density parameter (D) and probability of event occurrence (pe)
A. D and maximum pe (at C = 0)
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Figure 10 (continued)
C. D and pe plotted against t (at pc	
  = 0.003 and C = 0)
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Figure 11: Centrality parameter (C) and maximum probability of event occurrence
(pe)
A. C and maximum pe (at D = 0.03, D = 0.04, and D = 0.05)
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Figure 12: Network centralization (Cx) and probability of event occurrence (pe)
(at pc = 0.05)

B. D = 0.03

1

1

0.8

0.8

pe at t = 50

pe at t = 50

A. D = 0.02

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0.4
0.2
0

0

0.5

1

0

0.5

Cx	
  

Cx	
  

C. D = 0.04

D. D = 0.06

1

1

0.8

0.8

pe at t = 50

pe at t = 50

0.6

0.6
0.4
0.2

1

0.6
0.4
0.2
0

0
0

0.5

1

0

0.5

1

Cx	
  

Cx	
  

E. D = 0.08
pe at t = 50

1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

0.5

1

Cx	
  

158

Figure 13: Network centralization (Cx) and average path length (at pc = 0.05)
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Figure 14: Causal probability (pc) and probability of event occurrence (pe) plotted
against t (at D = 0.2 and C = 0)
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Figure 15: Link density (D) and latency (T) (at C = 0 and pc = 0.20)
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Figure 16: Centrality and latency (T) (at various pc)
A. Centrality parameter (C) and T
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Figure 17: Causal probability (pc) and latency (T)
(at D = 0.04, D = 0.08, D = 0.20, and C = 0)
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Figure 18: Link density (D) and cvT structural
(at C = 0 and pc = 0.01)
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Figure 19: Network centralization (Cx) and cvT structural
(at various D and pc = 0.05)
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Figure 20: Causal probability (pc) and cvT structural
(at various D and C)
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Figure 21: Link density (D) and cvT propagation
(at C = 0 and various pc)
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Figure 22: Link density (D) and coefficient of variance of path length (cvPL)
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Figure 23: Path length and cvT propagation (at pc = 0.1)
A. Varying path length, keeping everything else constant
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Figure 24: Number of alternative paths and cvT propagation	
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Figure 25: Effect of cvPL on cvT propagation	
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Figure 26: Network centralization (Cx) and cvT propagation
(at various D and pc = 0.05)
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Figure 27: Network centralization (Cx) and coefficient of variance of path length
(cvPL) (at various D)
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Figure 28: Effect of causal probability (pc) on cvT propagation in event network
(at various D and C)
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Figure 29: Effect of causal probability (pc) on cvT propagation in simple linear
chain (at average path length = 5, cvPL = 0.1)
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Figure 30: Four structurally distinct events
A. Low-link-density-low-centrality
(random)
N = 50, D = 0.08, C = 20

B. Low-link-density-high-centrality
N = 50, D = 0.08, C = 20

C. High-link-density-low-centrality
(random)
N = 50, D = 0.20, C = 0

D. High-link-density-high-centrality
N = 50, D = 0.20, C = 20
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Figure 31: Network centralization (Cx) in four network types
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Figure 32: Average path length in four network types
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Figure 33: Coefficient of variance of path length (cvPL) in four network types
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Figure 34: Jaccard similarity in four network types
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Figure 35: cvT	
  structural in four network types (at pc = 0.01)
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Figure 36: cvT	
  propagation in four network types (at pc = 0.01)
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Figure 37: Effect of rewiring parameter (w)
(at pc = 0.01, tf = 0)
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Figure 37 (continued)
C. Effect of w on ∆Cx*
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Figure 38: Effect of forecast time (tf)
(at pc = 0.01)
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Figure 38 (continued)
C. Average number of activated nodes at each time period
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Figure 39: Effect of attention (a)
(at pc = 0.01, tf = 40)
A. MNSET

MNSET	
  

0.10

LDLC

0.08

LDHC

0.06

HDLC

0.04

HDHC

0.02

Linear (LDLC)

0.00
0.00

Linear (LDHC)
0.25

0.50

0.75

a	
  
Within network
Network
type

Linear regression

Slope
R2
p-value
LDLC
-0.02563
0.86
0.02**
LDHC
-0.02845
0.82
0.04**
HDLC
-0.03454
0.76
0.05**
HDHC
-0.02316
0.66
0.09*
*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05
All p-values are two-tailed (when applicable)

1.00

Linear (HDLC)
Linear (HDHC)

Between networks (ANCOVA)
t-test between
extreme values
(a = 0.00 vs. a =
1.00)
p-value
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**

Network types
LDLC vs. LDHC
LDLC vs. HDLC
LDLC vs. HDHC
LDHC vs. HDLC
LDHC vs. HDHC
HDLC vs. HDHC

Between
intercepts
p-value
0.00**
0.03**
0.00**
0.00**
0.00**
0.48

Between
slopes
p-value
0.79
0.51
0.83
0.67
0.69
0.47

B. NSET

187

Figure 40: Effect of similarity threshold (s)
(at pc = 0.01, tf = 10)
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Figure 40 (continued)
C. Effect of s on the size of a forecasting agent’s zone of confusion
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Figure 41: Effect of temporal bias (b)
(at pc = 0.10, tf = 5)
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